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Protests, Terrorism, and Development: On 
Ethiopia’s State of Emergency 
Awol Allo† 
On October 8, 2016, the Ethiopian government officially declared a 
nationwide state of emergency in response to a year-long protest by 
members of Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups, the Oromo and the 
Amhara. The Directive issued to implement the state of emergency 
institutes a new normative regime, astonishing in scope and scale, in 
which the de jure reversal of the relationship between the rule and the 
exception has culminated in a new legal reality. This Article argues that 
Ethiopia’s de jure emergency is merely the latest manifestation of the de 
facto state of emergency in operation since the new Constitutional order 
was set in motion. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt, I 
argue that the state of emergency, the defining feature of which is the 
temporary suspension of the norm, where the rule of man replaces the rule 
of law and the Leviathan reigns supreme, has been the central paradigm of 
government in Ethiopia since the Constitution came into force. Although 
this Article considers theoretical and jurisprudential questions around 
states of emergency, the main thrust of the analysis is to demonstrate the 
structural relationship between protest, terrorism, development, and the 
state of emergency in Ethiopia. In particular, this Article reflects on how 
national narratives of counterterrorism and development have provided 
the discursive and normative background for the blurring of the boundary 
between the rule and the exception, enabling the government to exercise 
power in increasingly violent ways. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 8, 2016, the Ethiopian government declared a state of 
emergency in response to a nationwide protest by Ethiopia’s two largest 
ethnic groups: the Oromo1 and the Amhara.2 The directive,3 which took 
effect amidst a crisis of legitimacy for the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), provided the military and security forces with 
sweeping new powers4 to counter what the government described as the 
threat posed by “anti-peace groups” working “in close collaboration with 
foreign elements.”5 As soon as the emergency was formally imposed, the 
government officially restricted access to the internet6 and some media 
outlets,7 banned protests,8 and detained more than 26,000 protestors9 in 
                                                          
1. Ethiopia, CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/print_et.html [https://perma.cc/6MJ5-GBXB]. 
2. Id. 
3. State of Emergency Proclamation No. 1/2016, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
The Ethiopian House of Peoples’ Representatives endorsed this declaration on October 20, 
2016. See Ratification Proclamation No. 984/2016, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
9369. 
4. See Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: State of Emergency Risks New Abuses (Oct. 31, 
2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/31/ethiopia-state-emergency-risks-new-abuses 
[https://perma.cc/RS4G-8Q3N]. 
5. Tesfaye Wolde, Letter to the Editor, Ethiopia’s State of Emergency Will Work, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ethiopias-state-of-emergency-
will-work/2016/10/16/52f87c0a-923b-11e6-bc00-1a9756d4111b_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/XFQ8-R3F2]. 
6. See Seven Things Banned Under Ethiopia’s State of Emergency, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37679165 [https://perma.cc/AUU5-KC9J]. 
7. Id. 
8. See id.; see also Amnesty Int’l & Open Observatory of Network Interference [OONI], 
Ethiopia Offline: Evidence of Media Blocking and Internet Censorship in Ethiopia, AI Index AFR 
25/5312/2016, at 13 (2016), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR2553122016ENGLISH.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S6LM-S7XK] (noting that State of Emergency Directive No. 1/2016 banned 
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“rehabilitation camps.”10 
Faced with the government’s mass arrests and overwhelming use of 
force11 which resulted in the deaths of close to 700 protestors,12 the unrest 
subsided, giving way to an uneasy calm.13 Despite the apparent restoration 
of order and stability, the Ethiopian Parliament extended the state of 
emergency by another four months in March 2017,14 with it finally expiring 
in early August 2017.15 
The preceding year had seen the boiling over of separate, long-
simmering conflicts between the government and the various ethnic groups 
that make up the Ethiopian state.16 The protests in the regional state of 
Oromia that ultimately led to the formal declaration of a state of emergency 
started in response to the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master 
Plan (“the Master Plan”), which called for the expansion of the capital city 
                                                          
“all unauthorized protests and assemblies”). 
9. U.N. News Ctr., In Ethiopia, UN Rights Chief Urges Authorities for Greater Freedoms; 
Space for Critical Voices (May 4, 2017), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56682 [https://perma.cc/B58G-JFTG]. 
10. See Felix Horne (Sr. Researcher, Horn of Africa, Human Rights Watch), Ethiopia Lifts 
Some State of Emergency Restrictions (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/16/ethiopia-lifts-some-state-emergency-restrictions 
[https://perma.cc/999N-DENC] (noting the government’s use of “rehabilitation camps”); see 
also Human Rights Watch, Legal Analysis of Ethiopia’s State of Emergency (Oct. 30, 2016), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/30/legal-analysis-ethiopias-state-emergency 
[https://perma.cc/25NE-7LXG?type=image] [hereinafter Human Rights Watch Analysis of 
Ethiopia’s State of Emergency] (discussing the Ethiopian government’s “rehabilitation” 
practices). 
11. See Human Rights Watch, Addressing the Pervasive Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia 
(June 2, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/02/addressing-pervasive-human-
rights-crisis-ethiopia [https://perma.cc/PG8N-7RTA]. 
12. See Report: 669 Killed in Ethiopia Violence Since August, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 18, 2017), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/report-669-killed-ethiopia-violence-august-
170418164259637.html [https://perma.cc/RS4G-8Q3N]. 
13. See Paul Schemm, Despite Outward Calm, Ethiopia Extends State of Emergency, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/despite-outward-calm-
ethiopia-extends-state-of-emergency/2017/03/30/b5544098-1529-11e7-ada0-
1489b735b3a3_story.html [https://perma.cc/RR3H-GMKR] (“Since the emergency was 
declared, however, protests have dropped off dramatically, though with social media blocked, 
it is often difficult to determine the situation in the remote countryside.”). 
14. Id.; see also Ethiopia Extends State of Emergency by Four Months, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 30, 
2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/ethiopia-extends-state-emergency-months-
170330110807086.html [https://perma.cc/B4ZZ-4Q62]. 
15. The State of Emergency officially ended on August 4, 2017. See Aaron Maasho, Ethiopia 
Lifts Emergency Rule Imposed Last October After Months Of Unrest, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics-idUSKBN1AK0QV 
[https://perma.cc/5Y4C-38UL]; Felix Horne (Sr. Researcher, Horn of Africa, Human Rights 
Watch), State of Emergency Ends in Ethiopia (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/07/state-emergency-ends-ethiopia 
[https://perma.cc/M489-RG2A]. This Article was written while the State of Emergency was 
still in effect, although final revisions and formatting occurred  after the Ethiopian government 
chose not to extend the state of emergency further. 
16. The EPRDF, as discussed infra Part III, is a coalition created by the Tigray Peoples 
Liberation Front (TPLF), a political group that purports to represent the Tigray people. Yet 
note that the Tigray make up only a little more than six percent of Ethiopia’s population. See 
Ethiopia, supra note 1. 
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into neighboring Oromo towns and villages.17 In response to this expansion 
and the threat the Master Plan posed to the cultural and economic 
wellbeing of the community, people throughout Oromia took to the 
streets.18 Ethiopian security forces met the protesters with violence,19 
branding them as terrorists and anti-development forces bent on 
destabilizing the country.20 This cycle of government violence and 
escalating protests continued over the next eleven months.21 
As the government scrambled to contain the protests gripping Oromia, 
which is the largest region in the country, members of Ethiopia’s second 
largest ethnic group, the Amhara, took to the streets on July 12, 2016.22 As 
was the case in Oromia, there have been long simmering tensions between 
the Amhara and their Tigrayan neighbors to the north.23 The Amhara, 
whose elite dominated Ethiopia’s political and cultural life until the EPRDF 
reconfigured the country’s ideological and institutional structure along 
ethnolinguistic lines, have long accused the EPRDF of marginalizing them 
politically and economically.24 The Ethiopian government’s arbitrary arrest 
of the Welkait Amhara Identity Committee (“Welkait Committee”), a 
steering group established by ethnic Amharas to coordinate longstanding 
disputes over land,25 proved to be the final straw.26 When the government 
                                                          
17. See Human Rights Watch, UN Human Rights Council General Debate Under Item 4: 
Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia (Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/15/un-human-rights-council-general-debate-under-
item-4 [https://perma.cc/B5AY-D5YA]. 
18. See Jacey Fortin, Ethiopians on Edge as Infrastructure Plan Stirs Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/world/africa/ethiopia-addis-ababa-urban-
plan-oromia.html [https://perma.cc/8L7Q-XXR8]. 
19. Amnesty Int’l, Ethiopia: Anti-Terror Rhetoric Will Escalate Brutal Crackdown Against 
Oromo Protesters, (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/ethiopia-anti-
terror-rhetoric-will-escalate-brutal-crackdown-against-oromo-protesters 
[https://perma.cc/2NXS-E8G4]. 
20. Id.; see also Amnesty Int’l, Ethiopia: End Use of Counter-Terrorism Law To Persecute 
Dissenters and Opposition Members (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/ethiopia-using-counter-terrorism-law-
to-persecute-dissenters [https://perma.cc/BC9D-W2KM] [hereinafter End Use of Counter-
Terrorism Law]. 
21. See Amnesty Int’l, Ethiopia: After a Year of Protests, Time To Address Grave Human 
Rights Concerns (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/ethiopia-after-a-year-of-protests-time-
to-address-grave-human-rights-concerns [https://perma.cc/MM2E-TPMW]. 
22. René Lefort, Ethiopia’s Crisis, OPENDEMOCRACY (Nov. 19, 2016), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren-lefort/ethiopia-s-crisis [https://perma.cc/PQX7-
PVUL]. 
23. For a discussion of these tensions, see Kidane Mengisteab, State-building in Ethiopia, in 
BEYOND STATE FAILURE AND COLLAPSE: MAKING THE STATE RELEVANT IN AFRICA 99, 107-110 
(George Klay Kieh, Jr. ed., 2007) (discussing ethnic tensions in Ethiopia since the late 1990s); see 
also Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Hidden Crackdown in Rural Areas (Jan. 11, 2006), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/01/11/ethiopia-hidden-crackdown-rural-areas 
[https://perma.cc/TU5X-CZYQ] (discussing government crackdowns on Oromo and Amhara 
regions in 2006). 
24. CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: STRATEGIES AND ROLES 
OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 19-20 (1995). 
25. See Achamyeleh Tamiru, An Open Letter to Al Jazeera English from an Amhara Ethiopian, 
WELKAIT.COM (Aug. 24, 2016), http://welkait.com/?p=5709 [https://perma.cc/HKQ9-WHL4] 
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arrested the Welkait Committee’s leadership and local residents, thousands 
of Amhara protested,27 further intensifying the threat to the regime and its 
governing ideologies. 
By August of 2016, observers had already begun to note the unique 
scale and scope of protests.28 While unrest and violence had been common 
fixtures of Ethiopian political life over the previous twenty-five years of 
EPRDF rule, the simultaneous Oromo and Amhara protests represented a 
unique crisis of legitimacy and demonstrated the failure of the 
government’s divide-and-rule strategy. This failure was particularly 
apparent when Amhara protestors began to declare solidarity with the 
Oromo, their historic adversaries,29 using such rallying cries as: “we are all 
Oromos,” “I am not Oromo but I stand with my Oromo brothers,” and “the 
blood that flows in Oromia is our blood too.”30 
As it had done with previous protest movements, the EPRDF branded 
the Amhara protests as the work of terrorists and anti-peace forces31 and 
authorized the military and security forces to use all means necessary to 
bring them to an end.32 These tactics did not work, however. After clashes 
                                                          
(explaining the role of the steering committee). 
26. See Salem Solomon, What Is Fueling Ethiopia’s Protests?, VOA NEWS (Aug. 10, 2016), 
http://www.voanews.com/a/what-is-fueling-ethiopia-protests/3459102.html 
[https://perma.cc/6KB9-EJ8V] (noting that the arrests of Welkait Committee members 
sparked protests, clashes with police, and destruction of property). 
27. Amnesty Int’l, Ethiopia: Dozens Killed as Police Use Excessive Force Against Peaceful 
Protesters (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/ethiopia-
dozens-killed-as-police-use-excessive-force-against-peaceful-protesters 
[https://perma.cc/BE2R-H2CC]. 
28. See, e.g., AFP, Unprecedented Ethiopia Protests Far from Over: Analysts, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 
10, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3732964/Unprecedented-Ethiopia-
protests-far-analysts.html [https://perma.cc/622W-HYT8]; Ethiopia: Unprecedented Protests 
Creep Towards the Capital, STRATFOR: WORLDVIEW (Oct. 5, 2016) 
https://www.stratfor.com/snapshots/ethiopia-unprecedented-protests-creep-toward-capital 
[https://perma.cc/U35E-WQPY]. 
29. See DAWIT SHAFAW, THE DIARY OF TERROR: ETHIOPIA 1974 TO 1991, at 211 (2012) (noting 
that historical animosity between the Oromo and Amhara is more than a century old). 
30. See Jill Craig, Ethiopia Protests Highlight Growing Solidarity Between Oromia, Amhara 
Regions, VOA NEWS (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-protests-oromia-
amhara-regions/3457240.html [https://perma.cc/V876-328J]; see also Awol Allo, “The Blood 
Flowing in Oromia Is Our Blood Too”: Why Oromo-Amhara Solidarity Is the Greatest Threat to the 
Ethiopian Government, AFR. ARGUMENTS (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://africanarguments.org/2016/09/27/the-blood-flowing-in-oromia-is-our-blood-too-
why-oromo-amhara-solidarity-is-the-greatest-threat-to-the-ethiopian-government 
[https://perma.cc/B5AN-25N9]. 
31. See Matthew Tempest, Ethiopian Ambassador: ‘Anti-Peace Elements’ Took Advantage of 
Oromia, Amhara Protests, EURACTIV.TV (Oct. 5, 2016), 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/interview/ethiopian-government-
answers-critics-over-oromia-amhara-protest-deaths [https://perma.cc/Y3JR-EJ3P]. 
32. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, supra note 27 (discussing the Ethiopian government’s use of 
excessive force against Amhara and Oromo protesters during the summer of 2016); Ismail 
Akwei, Ethiopia: Several Killed, Dozens Arrested, as Anti-Government Protests Continue, ALL AFR. 
NEWS (Aug. 7, 2016), http://www.africanews.com/2016/08/07/ethiopia-several-killed-
dozens-arrested-as-anti-government-protests-continue [https://perma.cc/KU52-HBYL] 
(discussing the continued crackdown on protesters, including “reports of heavy gunfire” in the 
capital of the Amhara region; Moses Karanja, Maria Xynou & Arturo Filastò, How the Ethiopia 
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between protestors and security forces set off a deadly stampede at the 
October 2016 Irreecha festival in Oromia,33 movement leaders called for 
“five days of rage”34 and, in a shift of tactics, began attacking government 
buildings and corporate investments throughout the region.35 
On October 8, 2016, the Council of Ministers declared a state of 
emergency36 to restore “peace and order”37 and to preserve “the integrity of 
the country.”38 On October 20, 2016, the Ethiopian House of Peoples’ 
Representatives approved the October 8th Proclamation of a State of 
Emergency.39 
The framing of opposition as a national security threat or as a threat to 
the country’s developmental ambitions has been—and continues to be—a 
common tactic used by the Ethiopian government40 to silence and 
intimidate their opposition, while also legitimizing the violent responses of 
the government.41 Protests, particularly by Oromos, have long been viewed 
by the government through the prism of security. As I will demonstrate in 
this Article, many of the measures that the Ethiopian government 
implemented under this state of emergency represent long-standing 
                                                          
Protests Were Stifled by a Coordinated Internet Shutdown, QUARTZ (Aug. 14, 2016), 
https://qz.com/757824/how-the-ethiopia-protests-were-stifled-by-a-coordinated-internet-
shutdown [https://perma.cc/M9GF-M3LX] (discussing the Ethiopian government’s 
shutdown of internet access in August 2016). 
33. See Ethiopia: ‘Several’ Killed in Oromia Festival Stampede, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 2, 2016), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/ethiopia-killed-oromia-festival-stampede-
161002100716026.html [https://perma.cc/3M5Y-6BMH]; Human Rts Watch, Q&A: Recent 
Events and Deaths at the Irreecha Festival in Ethiopia (Oct. 8, 2016), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/08/qa-recent-events-and-deaths-irreecha-festival-
ethiopia [https://perma.cc/V4VS-6HS7]. The number of deaths caused by the stampede is in 
dispute. See id. While the government has claimed that around 52 people died, the opposition 
Oromo Federalist Congress Party has claimed that more than 678 people were killed as a result 
of the stampede. #IrrechaMassacre: The Day that Changed the Game, ADDIS STANDARD, Oct. 2016, 
at 5, http://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Special-Edition-on-Irreecha-
Oct.-2016-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HYG-NTV2]. 
34. Ethiopia: Unrest Continues a Day After Deadly Stampede, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/ethiopia-unrest-continues-day-deadly-stampede-
161003130002688.html [https://perma.cc/U5D5-8ABX]. 
35. John Aglionby & Edith Honan, Ethiopian Protesters Ramp Up Attacks on Foreign 
Companies, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/a1ceca0e-8b11-11e6-8cb7-
e7ada1d123b1 [https://perma.cc/N9AC-Z2CD]. 
36. State of Emergency Proclamation No. 1/2016, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
37. Implementation Directive for State of Emergency Proclamation No. 1/2016 (Oct. 15, 
2016) (Eth.), translated in Ethiopia State of Emergency Directive – October 15, 2016, AFR. ICT 
POL’Y DATABASE http://www.ictpolicy.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Ethiopia-
State-of-Emergency-Directive-October-15-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3M48-UU6Q] . 
38. Elias Meseret, AP Explains: Why Ethiopia Is Under a State of Emergency, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.apnews.com/47c58595becf4039be8970ee7e5a6d77 
[https://perma.cc/R6EK-QV9K] (quoting Prime Minister Desalegn as claiming, “[t]he recent 
developments in Ethiopia have put the integrity of the nation at risk.”). 
39. See Ratification Proclamation No. 984/2016, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 9369. 
40. See Tobias Hagmann & Jon Abbink, The Politics of Authoritarian Reform in Ethiopia, 1991 
to 2011, 5 J. E. AFR. STUD. 579, 585 (2011). 
41. Human Rights Watch Analysis of Ethiopia’s State of Emergency, supra note 10. 
DRAFT: NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR CITATION. 11/6/2017  11:10 AM 
2017] On Ethiopia’s State of Emergency 139 
government policies and practices. 
This Article unfolds in five stages. In Part I, I provide a theoretical and 
jurisprudential overview of the state of emergency and its distinguishing 
elements. This analysis takes as its starting point Carl Schmitt and Giorgio 
Agamben’s exploration of the state of emergency and its ambiguous 
relationship with law and sovereignty. In Part II, I briefly discuss the state 
of emergency provisions of the Ethiopian Constitution and argue that the 
Constitution and its commendable provisions have been coopted and used 
as a normative instrument to achieve malign outcomes. Instead of 
constraining executive power, the Constitution has served as a weapon 
used to camouflage the ruling party’s ploy to build a highly authoritarian 
system that thrives on patronage, rent-seeking, divide-and-rule tactics, and 
violence, rendering the state of emergency provision a conceptual anomaly. 
In Part III, I elucidate the ways in which the Ethiopian government has 
weaponized the 1995 Constitution to conceal its increasingly authoritarian 
and violent exercise of power, culminating in the obliteration of the 
distinction between the rule and the exception, the temporary and the 
indefinite. By tracing this pathology to the asymmetries of power and 
structural instabilities at the heart of the post-Derg state building project, I 
argue that the state of emergency, the defining feature of which is the 
temporary suspension of the normative order, has been the central 
paradigm of government in Ethiopia since the Constitution came into force. 
In Part IV I focus on  two governing narratives—the “Ethiopia Rising” 
narrative and the “National Security” narrative— critical to the framing, 
structuring, and legitimation of  this  de facto state of emergency both at 
home and abroad. Finally, in Part V, I turn to the mass protests that have 
gripped the country and the violent response of the government, arguing 
that the de jure state of emergency is driven less by the need to safeguard 
the vital interests of the state than by a desire to protect the political and 
economic hegemony of the ruling elite. 
I. STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THEORY AND LAW 
A. Conceptual Background 
A state of emergency, variously known as a “state of exception,” a 
“state of siege,”or “martial law,”42 is a juridico-political regime that 
comprises “governmental action taken during an extraordinary national 
crisis that usually entails broad restrictions of human rights.”43 When 
confronted by a national crisis that threatens the life of the nation, such as 
                                                          
42. Claudio Grossman, A Framework for the Examination of States of Emergency Under the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 35, 35 (1986); U.N. OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INT’L BAR ASSOC., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND 
LAWYERS 813 (2003). 
43. Grossman, supra note 42, at 36. 
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war or other forms of social upheaval,44 governments can limit or suspend 
the enjoyment of some human rights in order to quell the crisis and restore 
the normal state of the nation.45 So understood, the state of emergency is 
predicated on the conceptual distinction between normalcy and emergency. 
Normalcy signifies the general rule, the permanent and normal state of 
things. Emergency, on the other hand, denotes the exception and therefore 
only confers temporary, limited power.46 Further examination, however, 
reveals the ambiguous nature of the state of emergency, situated at the 
intersection of legality and illegality. 
As Carl Schmitt notes, the state of emergency has a tense relationship 
with liberal constitutional theory. In Dictatorship, written in the aftermath of 
the First World War and the Russian Revolution, Schmitt draws on the 
distinction between sovereign dictatorship and commissarial dictatorship 
to show the irreconcilability of liberalism with the state of exception. 
Arguing against Rousseau, who views exceptional emergency power as 
compatible with the general will,47 Schmitt asks an important question: who 
decides the threshold at which the constitution must be suspended and a 
commissarial dictatorship summoned?48 
Critical to understanding Schmitt’s view of emergency is his conception 
of sovereignty. In Political Theology, Schmitt defines the sovereign as “he 
who decides on the exception.”49 For Schmitt, any analysis of the state of 
emergency must begin not from the norm but from the exception.50 “The 
                                                          
44. See Euro. Comm. for Dem’y Through Law, Rep. on Emergency Powers by Mr. Ergun 
Özbudun and Mr. Mehmet Turhan, at 3, Doc. No. CDL-STD(1995) 012 (noting that public 
emergency situations include war, emergencies that threaten the life of a nation, or public 
dangers threatening a nation’s security of independence). 
45. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 4(1), opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. No. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] 
(discussing the ability of States Parties to the ICCPR to limit their compliance with the ICCPR 
during an officially declared public emergency). Ethiopia ratified the ICCPR in 1993. U.N. 
Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Chapter IV: 
Human Rights, 4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V2AK-G9GY]. 
46. See JAIMEE ORAÁ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-
22 (1992). 
47. On this issue, Rousseau writes: 
If, on the other hand, the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are 
an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme ruler, who shall 
silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, 
there is no doubt about the general will, and it is clear that the people’s first intention is 
that the State shall not perish. Thus the suspension of the legislative authority is in no 
sense its abolition; the magistrate who silences it cannot make it speak; he dominates it, 
but cannot represent it. He can do anything, except make laws. 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 86 (G.D.H. COLE TRANS., DOVER BOOKS 2003) 
(1762). 
48. CARL SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP 109-11 (Michael Hielzl & Graham Ward trans., Polity 
Press 2014). 
49. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY – FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., 2005) (1985). 
50. Id. (“The definition of sovereignty must therefore be associated with a borderline case 
and not with routine.”). 
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rule,” he insists, “proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It 
confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from 
the exception.”51 
From here, Schmitt claims that a formal legal order exists only when a 
normal situation exists,52 yet the existence of a normal situation cannot be 
subject to normative regulation.53 It is the sovereign, who, in the last 
instance, decides whether this normal situation actually exists.54 Faced with 
an exception that is fundamentally at odds with the sacred status of liberal 
democratic values of limited government, the rule of law, and human 
rights, liberal constitutionalism necessarily gives way to authoritarianism.55 
For Schmitt, a liberal democracy with a state of emergency is nothing but an 
oxymoron.56 
In his landmark work, State of Exception, Georgio Agamben draws on 
Schmitt’s writings to offer a rich and sustained conceptual account of state 
of emergency without endorsing Schmitt’s authoritarian positions.57 
Exploring conceptions of sovereign authority, Agamben identifies two 
main strands of thought on the relationship between law and the state of 
emergency.58 The first strand traces its roots to the emergence of the 
revolutionary-democratic tradition and locates the state of exception 
“within the sphere of the juridical order.”59 For those who subscribe to this 
view, the norm and the exception are distinguishable and the legal regime 
of emergency can be objectively regulated by law.60 This view, referred to 
as the rule of law model of state of emergency, represents the view 
entrenched in modern constitutions and international human rights 
instruments.61 
By contrast, the second strand of thought which Agamben identifies 
                                                          
51. Id. at 15. 
52. Id. at 13. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See id. at 12 (“What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority, which 
means the suspension of the entire existing order. In such a situation it is clear that the state 
remains, whereas law recedes.”). 
56. See id. (“The tendency of liberal constitutionalism to regulate the exception as precisely 
as possible means, after all, the attempt to spell out in detail the case in which law suspends 
itself. From where does the law obtain this force, and how is it logically possible that a norm is 
valid except for one concrete case that it cannot factually determine in any definitive 
manner?”). 
57. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 22-23 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005). For a brief 
discussion of these critiques, see Scott P. Sheeran, Reconceptualizing States of Emergency Under 
International Human Rights Law: Theory, Legal Doctrine, and Politics, 34 MICH. J. INT’L. L 491, 501-
02 (2013). 
58. AGAMBEN, supra note 57, at 22-23. 
59. Id. at 22-23. Agamben lists Santi Romano, Maurice Hauriou, and Constantino Mortati 
as scholars who belong to this category. Id. For a modern consideration of this line of thought, 
see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004). 
60. Ferejohn and Pasquino, in their attempt to craft clear typologies for post-9/11 
emergency thought, describe this strand of thought as both dualist and realist. See John 
Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 210, 226 (2004). 
61. See Sheeran, supra note 57, at 500-01. 
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questions the very possibility of a normative distinction between the rule 
and the exception.62 These thinkers view a state of emergency—and the 
necessity that underpins it—as “something prior to or other than the law,”63 
rejecting “the pretense of regulating by law”64 what is “essentially 
extrajuridical.”65 They insist, a la Alexander Hamilton, that “the 
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this 
reason, no constitutional shackles can be imposed on the power to which 
the care of it is committed.”66 As such, the sovereign, to whom the care of 
the constitutional order is entrusted, must have unlimited power to restore 
the constitutional order.67 
Agamben rejects the inside-outside opposition implicit in the above 
conceptualizations of the relationship between law and the state of 
exception.68 He asks, “If the state of exception’s characteristic property is a 
(total or partial) suspension of the juridical order, how can such a 
suspension still be contained within it?”69 Agamben reasons that any 
constitutional provision that prescribes the terms by which the constitution 
is itself suspended represents a legal contradiction: 
 
If exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, 
as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional 
grounds . . . , then they find themselves in the paradoxical position of 
being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms, and 
the state of exception appears as the legal form of what cannot have 
legal form.70 
 
Agamben argues that the state of exception is “neither internal nor 
external to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns . . . a 
threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not 
exclude each other but rather blur with each other.”71 It is by definition 
                                                          
62. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 60, at 226 (“Some other thinkers (let’s call them 
‘skeptics,’ or we may call them Schmittians) claim that there is no absolute evidence of the 
existence of an exceptional situation, that people will inevitably disagree about its existence, 
and thus we need to attribute to some agency (organ or institution) the epistemic authority to 
declare the exception.”). Agamben includes in this category jurists such as Paolo Biscaretti de 
Buffia, Giorgio Balladore-Pallieri, and Raymond Carré de Malberg. AGAMBEN, supra note 58, at 
23. 
63. Stephen Humphreys, Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception, 17 
EURO. J. INT’L. L. 677, 678 (2006). 
64. AGAMBEN, supra note 57, at 10. 
65. Id. at 23. These scholars recognize that the state of exception produces legal effects. 
However, they believe the state of exception is nevertheless a phenomenon too contingent and 
ambivalent to be exhausted within the juridical domain. Id. 
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton). Stephen Humphreys makes this same 
observation. See Humphreys, supra note 63, at 678. 
67. See Humphreys, supra note 63, , at 678. 
68. AGAMBEN, supra note 57, at 23. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1 (citation omitted). 
71. Id. at 23. 
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located within a blurred, undefinable, “non-place” with regard to the law.72 
To locate this ambivalent juridico-political regime as fully outside or inside 
the juridical order, to approach it simply as a question of interiority or 
exteriority or to conceive it simply as law or politics, is to misunderstand 
the groundless nature of the juridical order and its performative 
inauguration. 
So understood, Agamben notes that the state of exception occupies a 
“juridically empty space,”73 comprising “a fictio iuris par excellence, which 
claims to maintain the law in its very suspension.”74 The state of exception, 
a central aporia in politics and public law, determines the threshold at 
which legality and illegality blur, and the threshold at which the 
sovereign’s violence creeps into law, and the sovereign’s law degenerates 
into violence. 
B. States of Emergency in Law 
Although scholars have traced the history of states of emergency to the 
Roman Republic,75 the contemporary legal regime of emergency has its 
origin in the French Revolution.76 
 
Although the state of emergency traces its history to the Roman republic,77 
the contemporary legal regime of emergency has its origin in the French 
Revolution.78 For the first time, the contemporary notion of state of 
emergency found legal expression in a 1789 Decree of the French 
Constituent Assembly.79 Distinguishing between a ‘state of peace’ and a 
                                                          
72. Id. at 51; see also Saul Newman & Michael P. Levine, War, Politics and Race: Reflections on 
Violence in the ‘War on Terror,’ 53 THEORIA 23, 24 (2006) (noting that Agamben’s state of 
emergency exists in a “sort of gray zone or no-man’s-land between law and lawlessness; 
between the rule of law and its abrogation”). 
73. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 36 (Daniel Heller-
Roazen trans., Stan. U. Press 1998) (1995). 
74. AGAMBEN, supra note 57, at 59 (emphasis in original). 
75. For a discussion of the state of emergency’s Roman connections and an introduction to 
other historical context, see JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST 
AND SECOND DISCOURSES 242-43 (Susan Dunn ed., 2002); Bernard Manin, The Emergency 
Paradigm and the New Terrorism, in LES USAGES DE LA SÉPARATION DES POUVOIRS–THE USES OF 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 136, 137-52 (Sandrine Baume & Biancamaria Fontana eds., 2008). 
76. AGAMBEN, supra note 58, at 59; see also Humphreys, supra note 63, at 678-79 (2006) 
(recounting Agamben’s discussion of the history of states of emergency). 
77
 QQ For a discussion of state of emergency’s Roman connections, see JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND 
DISCOURSES 242-43 (Susan Dunn ed., 2002); Bernard Manin, The Emergency 
Paradigm and the New Terrorism, in LES USAGES DE LA SÉPARATION DES 
POUVOIRS–THE USES OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 136, 137-140 (Sandrine 
Baume & Biancamaria Fontana eds., 2008). For further history, see id. 140-152. 
78
 Stephen Humphreys, Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben’s State of 
Exception, 17 EURO. J. INT’L. L. 677, 679 (2006). 
79
 Id.  
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‘state of siege’, the Assembly assigned ‘all the functions entrusted to the 
civilian authority for maintaining order and internal policing …to the 
military commander, who [shall] exercise them under his exclusive 
responsibility.”80 In 1848, the Constitution of the Second French Republic 
recognized state of emergency as a constitutional norm by authorizing 
parliament to declare a state of siege ‘establishing … the occasions, forms, 
and effects of siege.’81 
 
 In contemporary liberal democracies, the state of emergency is 
conceived as an exceptional moment that calls for extraordinary state 
measures to secure the vital interests of the state.82 In his post-World War II 
survey of the responses of liberal democracies to the state of emergency, 
Clinton Rossiter argues that “in time of crisis, a democratic, constitutional 
government must temporarily be altered to whatever degree is necessary to 
overcome the peril and restore normal conditions.”83 According to this 
view, when a vital interest of a democratic society is at stake, governments 
should have the authority to use extraordinary powers to remove the threat 
and restore the “constitutional order wherein such rights can be freely 
enjoyed and duly guaranteed without discrimination.”84 In providing for 
exceptional state measures at the threshold of necessity and the rule of law, 
modern, liberal democratic constitutions assume the inevitability of crisis 
that calls for exceptional measures, even conceding that “most human 
rights are not absolute but rather reflect a balance between individual and 
community interests.”85 Yet, even with this assumption, the predominant 
objective of such measures remains the expeditious restoration of the 
democratic order in which full respect of human and democratic rights can 
be secured.86 
Most general international human rights treaties allow state parties to 
derogate from many of their human rights obligations in times of 
emergency,87 while at the same time setting stringent safeguards against 
                                                          
80
 Id. 
81
 See Agamben, supra note 44 at 12. 
82. Anna Khakee, Policy Paper No. 30: Securing Democracy? A Comparative Analysis of 
Emergency Powers in Europe, GENEVA CTR. FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES 5 
(2009), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99550/PP30_Anna_Khakee_Emergency_Powers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MEF-BZVG]; see also id. annex 1 (summarizing, in table form, the main 
aspects of constitutional emergency provisions and conditions in EU member states, Norway, 
and Switzerland). 
83. CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE 
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 5 (1963). 
84. ANNA-LENA SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
STATES OF EXCEPTION: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES AND CASE-
LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING ORGANS 3 (1998) (emphasis in original). 
85. Dominic McGoldrick, The Interface Between Public Emergency Powers and International 
Law, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 380, 383 (2004); see also id. at 383-86 (discussing the overlap and 
differences between limitations and derogations, as well as the wide acceptance of derogations 
under at least some circumstances). 
86. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 84, at 3. 
87. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 4; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
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abuse.88 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a 
universal treaty which affirms “the inherent dignity . . . of all members of 
the human family [as] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world,”89 recognizes the right of state parties to derogate from Covenant 
obligations in times of national crisis. When confronted by a “public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation,”90 governments may take 
measures to “the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.”91 
Article 4 of the ICCPR outlines the circumstances under which State 
parties may derogate from protecting and fulfilling these rights.92 Generally 
speaking, States can avoid running afoul of their ICCPR commitments 
provided that (1) the state faces a “public emergency which threatens the 
life of the nation,”93 (2) the measures undertaken are those “strictly required 
                                                          
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; 
American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123. Note, however, that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened 
for signature June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 218, is the only general or regional human rights 
treaty without a derogation clause. See Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, Nos. 105/93-128/94-
130/94-152/96, Decision, Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Cm. H.P.R.], ¶¶ 
67-68 (Oct. 31, 1998), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/24th/comunications/105.93-
128.94-130.94-152.96/achpr24_105.93_128.94_130.94_152.96_eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6W5W-D7PC] (“The African Charter does not contain a derogation clause. 
Therefore the limitations on the rights and freedoms enshrined in the charter cannot be 
justified by emergencies and special circumstances. The only legitimate reasons for limitations 
to the rights and freedoms of the Charter are found in article 27 (2).”). 
88. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 4(1)-(2) (noting limitations on measures, as well as 
some rights absolutely protected from derogation). 
89. Id. pmbl. 
90. Id. art 4(1). 
91. Id. 
92. See id. art. 4(1)-(3). Note that, even under a declared state of emergency, the ICCPR 
does not allow parties to derogate from many fundamental human rights: 
Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant explicitly prescribes that no derogation from 
the following articles may be made: Article 6 (right to life), article 7 (prohibition of 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, or of medical or scientific 
experimentation without consent), article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2 (prohibition of slavery, 
slave-trade and servitude), article 11 (prohibition of imprisonment because of inability 
to fulfil a contractual obligation), article 15 (the principle of legality in the field of 
criminal law, i.e. the requirement of both criminal liability and punishment being 
limited to clear and precise provisions in the law that was in place and applicable at 
the time the act or omission took place, except in cases where a later law imposes a 
lighter penalty), article 16 (the recognition of everyone as a person before the law), and 
article 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion). 
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4) ¶ 7, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
93. While states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining whether there exists 
“a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation,” not every crisis constitutes a public 
emergency that warrants derogation. See Human Rights Comm., supra note 92, ¶ 3 & n. 1. The 
travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR make clear “that the right to derogate was not intended to 
be used by authoritarian regimes seeking to eliminate human rights and that it cannot be used 
to save a specific Government.” U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INT’L 
BAR ASSOC., supra note 42, at 821. Although the European human rights system allows states a 
wide margin of appreciation in determining the existence of emergencies and the type of 
measures appropriate to restore normalcy, it reserves the right to supervise whether 
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by the exigencies of the situation,”94 (3) “such measures are not inconsistent 
with their other obligations under international law”95 and (4) they “do not 
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, or social origin.”96 In its General Comment elucidating the scope 
and normative content of the ICCPR’s state of emergency clause, the 
Human Rights Committee states that “the restoration of a state of normalcy 
where full respect for the Covenant can again be secured must be the 
predominant objective of a State party derogating from the Covenant.”97 
II. THE STATE OF EMERGENCY UNDER THE ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTION 
The emergency provision of the Ethiopian Constitution98 reflects many 
of the central tenets of emergency regimes in the ICCPR and liberal 
constitutions. Article 93 states: 
 
1. (a) The Council of Ministers of the Federal Government shall have 
the power to decree a state of emergency should an external invasion, a 
break down of law and order which endangers the constitutional order 
and which cannot be controlled by the regular law enforcement 
agencies and personnel, a natural disaster, or an epidemic occur. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
4.  (a) When a state of emergency is declared, the Council of Ministers 
shall, in accordance with regulations it issues, have all necessary power 
to protect the country’s peace and sovereignty, and to maintain public 
security, law and order; 
 
(b) The Council of Ministers shall have the power to suspend such 
political and democratic rights contained in this Constitution to the 
extent necessary to avert the conditions that required the declaration of 
a state of emergency. 
 
                                                          
derogating states have remained within the confines of the Convention and its case law. See, 
e.g., Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961) (interpreting 
the phrase ‘public emergencies” as “an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which 
affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of 
which the State is composed.”); Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece 
(“The Greek Case”), App. Nos. 3321/67; 3322/67; 3323/67; 3344/67, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On 
H.R. 1 (1969) (Euro. Comm’n on H.R.) (rejecting claims by Greek authorities that the military 
coup constituted a public emergency due to the fact that the coup was undertaken by the 
military itself). 
94. ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 4(1). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. See Human Rights Comm., supra note 92, ¶ 1. 
98. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA [hereinafter 
FDRE CONST.], Dec. 8, 1994, art. 93. For a list of non-derogable rights under the Ethiopian 
Constitution, see id. art. 93(4)(c). 
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(c) In the exercise of its emergency powers the Council of Ministers 
cannot, however, suspend or limit the rights provided for in Articles 1, 
18, 25, and sub-Articles 1 and 2 of [A]rticle 39 of this Constitution.99 
 
If the government’s use of emergency powers really extended only as 
far as these constitutional provisions allow, Ethiopia’s political situation 
would be largely consistent with most modern liberal constitutions and 
international human rights treaties. In practice, however, the Ethiopian 
Constitution is simply not a meaningful constraint on the exercise of 
political power. The government, which has remained in power since the 
1991 downfall of Marxist-Leninist military dictatorship known as the Derg, 
holds an iron grip over the population, controlling almost all aspects of 
public, social, and even of private life.100 At present, the ruling party 
controls a hundred percent of the seats in the federal parliamentary and 
regional assemblies.101 Civil liberties, the rule of law, and other institutions 
of democracy that the Constitution purports to entrench have never 
effectively constrained the power of the government. Rather than serving as 
an instrument of limitation and accountability, the Constitution provides 
the normative and institutional framework within which a diverse network 
of programs, tactics, mechanisms, and analyses are mobilized to sustain 
and preserve an all-powerful interventionist state. 
In the last twenty-fiveyears, these practices have crystallized into a 
political order in which the complete suspension of the Constitution’s 
purported restraints and the discretionary enforcement of extraordinary 
state measures came to be the norm, not the exception.  Thus, the recent 
state of emergency proclaimed by the Ethiopian government, which 
culminated in the de jure reversal of the relationship between the norm and 
the exception, is merely the latest manifestation of the de facto state of 
emergency that has been the central paradigm of government in Ethiopia 
for the last twenty-five years. 
                                                          
99. Id. Regarding art. 93(4)(c), Article 1 refers to the name and the base structure of the 
government (“Nomenclature of the State”); Article 18 refers to the “Prohibition against 
Inhuman Treatment”; Article 25 refers to the “Right to Equality”; and Article 39(1)-(2) refers to 
the rights of “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia” to the “unconditional right to 
self-determination” and the right to secession, as well as the right to language, culture, and 
history. Id. arts. 1, 18, 25 & 39(1)-(2). 
100. See Human Rights Watch, Development Without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites 
Repression in Ethiopia, at 4 (2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia1010webwcover.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z4NG-AKRM] (“Led by the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), the government has used donor-supported programs, salaries, and 
training opportunities as political weapons to control the population, punish dissent, and 
undermine political opponents—both real and perceived. Local officials deny these people 
access to seeds and fertilizer, agricultural land, credit, food aid, and other resources for 
development.”). 
101. Agence France-Presse, Ethiopia’s Ruling Party Wins by Landslide in General Election, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/ethiopias-
ruling-party-win-clean-sweep-general-election [https://perma.cc/P5N5-PDU9]. 
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III. ETHIOPIA’S MARCH TOWARD DE JURE EMERGENCY 
A diverse “nation of nations” comprising more than eighty ethnic 
groups,102 Ethiopia has long lived under governments that legitimize their 
rule based on tradition, violence, or a combination of the two.103 Until the 
1974 Revolution, Ethiopia had been subject to highly centralized rule by 
monarchs who elevated the Amhara, Ethiopia’s second largest ethnic 
group, to political and cultural dominance.104 Ethnic domination and 
cultural subordination, coupled with long-standing disputes over land, 
form the two major sources of political strife in Ethiopia. The political 
repression, cultural subordination, and violent land-grab policies that 
characterized much of Imperial Ethiopia were the central causes of the 1974 
Revolution, which brought the Derg into power.105 During its initial years 
of rule, the Derg nationalized all rural land and eliminated private land 
ownership.106 The Derg also adopted the Program for the National 
Democratic Revolution, which, at least on paper, recognized  Ethiopia’s 
various nationalities’ right to self-determination.107 Despite these measures, 
the Derg was nevertheless a Marxist autocracy, “unitarist and universalist 
in the extreme.”108 Ultimately, the Derg was unable to accommodate claims 
of self-rule, cultural justice, and autonomy by ethno-national groups, and 
                                                          
102. John Abbink, The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile “Social Contract,” 44 AFR. 
SPECTRUM 3, 4 (2009). 
103. See Tsegaye Regassa, The Making and Legitimacy of the Ethiopian Constitution: Towards 
Bridging the Gap Between Constitutional Design and Constitutional Practice, 23 AFRIKA FOCUS 85, 
114 (2010). (“In Ethiopia’s history, constitutional legitimation of power was rare. Historically, 
legitimacy is endowed on a regime by force, religion, and tradition. The polity was a product 
of an amalgam of force and evolution.”). 
104. See Paul H. Brietzke, Ethiopia’s “Leap in the Dark”: Federalism and Self-Determination in 
the New Constitution, 39 J. AFR. L. 19, 19 (1995) (“Rather than creating a constitutional 
monarchy, Haile Selassie’s Constitutions of 1931 and 1955 amounted to monarchical 
constitutions. A small Amhara elite from Shoa Province, a group whose successors are now in 
political eclipse, obtained patronage-access to land, office, and the many other perks within the 
Emperor’s gift-but all effective power remained in Haile Selassie’s hands.”); see also DONALD 
LEVINE, GREATER ETHIOPIA: THE EVOLUTION OF A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY 70-86 (outlining how 
Amhara culture and politics came to dominate Ethiopia prior to the Derg). 
105. See Vijay Gupta, The Ethiopian Revolution: Causes and Results, IND. Q. 158, 158-60 (1978). 
On the history of land issues, see generally Teshome Chala, Analysis of Politics in Land Tenure 
System: Experience of Successive Ethiopian Regimes Since 1930, 10 AFR. J. POL. SCI. & INT’L REL. 111 
(2016). Note that both land issues and the rights of ethnic nations and nationalities were 
problems during the drafting of the 1995 Constitution. See Brietzke, supra note 104, at 25 
(noting that “[t]he head of the [Constitutional Drafting] Commission, Kifle Wodajo, stated that 
the controversial issues were the secularization of the state, land ownership and the rights of 
nations/nationalities”). 
106. See Brietzke, supra note 104, at 23; see also HAILELEUL GETAHUN, ASSAULT ON RURAL 
PROPERTY: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA 51-53 (2001); A Proclamation to Provide for the Public 
Ownership of Rural Lands, FED. NEGARIT GAZETA No. 31 (July 26, 1975) (Eth.); A Proclamation 
to Provide for the Public Ownership of Urban Lands and Extra Urban Houses, FED. NEGARIT 
GAZETA No. 47 (1975). 
107. Edmond J. Keller, Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Political Transitions in Ethiopia: 
Historic and Contemporary Processes, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL UNITY: A 
CHALLENGE FOR AFRICA 57, 71 (Francis M. Deng ed., 2010). 
108. Brietzke, supra note 104, at 20. 
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the regime ultimately collapsed after seventeen years of bloody civil war.109 
With the downfall of the Derg came the real possibility of a break with 
the country’s violent past and new path toward a liberal constitutional 
order. The Transitional Period Charter adopted immediately after the 
collapse of the Derg promised “a new chapter in Ethiopian history in which 
freedom, equal rights, and self-determination of all the peoples shall be the 
governing principles of political, economic and social life.”110 The 
Constitution, which came into force in 1995, contained language that 
reflected the spirit of the Transitional Period Charter, with its framers 
describing themselves in the preamble as “[w]e, the Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples of Ethiopia, strongly committed, in full and free exercise of our 
right to self-determination, to building a political community founded on 
the rule of law and capable of ensuring a lasting peace, guaranteeing a 
democratic order.”111A highly centralized and assimilationist state that had 
long celebrated a single culture and identity112 became a federation of 
ethnonational groups.113 These federating units were granted “the right to 
self-determination, including the right to secession.”114 
The 1995 Constitution also enshrines an extensive list of civil and 
political rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights.115 It charges 
all levels of government with “the responsibility and duty to respect and 
enforce” the human rights provisions of the Constitution,116 which largely 
mirror international human rights treaties.117 The Constitution further 
requires those fundamental rights to be understood as conforming to “the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International 
Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments adopted by 
Ethiopia.”118 
Although the written text of the Constitution represented a radical 
reorientation of the normative landscape and the political discourse, the 
undemocratic process by which the Constitution was drafted and adopted 
                                                          
109. Keller, supra note 107, at 71-76. 
110. Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 1, FED. NEGARIT GAZETA 
Year 50, No. 1, (July 22, 1991), pmbl. (Eth.). 
111. FDRE CONST., supra note 94, pmbl. 
112. The policy of centralization and homogenization of such a diverse society by 
subsequent regimes rendered Amhara culture and identity the Ethiopian culture and identity 
par excellence, culminating in the assimilation of other ethnonational groups and the erasure 
of their memories and experiences from mainstream perspectives. See LEVINE, supra note 104, 
at 70-86. 
113. FDRE CONST., supra note 94, art. 47 (listing the states of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia); see also Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Response of 
the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to questions raised by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc 
CERD/C/ETH/CO/15/Add.1 (June 3, 2008) (describing the basis for the federal states). 
114. Id. art. 39. 
115. See id. arts. 13-44 (listing fundamental rights and freedoms). 
116. Id. art. 13(1). 
117. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 113, ¶ 8 (“The various 
provisions of the [1995 Constitution] also took inspiration from existing international human 
rights instruments and norms.”). 
118. FDRE CONST., supra note 94, art. 13(2). 
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blemished its progressive and liberal contents. The drafting, which took 
roughly four years,119 was dominated by the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of four ethnonational 
political parties created and led by the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front 
(TPLF) in the final years of the war.120 The other three constituent parties of 
the EPRDF, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), the 
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), and the Southern 
Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM), were not autonomous 
movements representing and expressing the collective free will of their 
respective communities.121 Makau wa Mutua, an eminent African legal 
scholar, summarizes the political consideration behind creating the EPRDF: 
 
In the mid-1980s, the TPLF realized its inability to govern Ethiopia 
alone once Mengistu Haile Mariam was overthrown. It therefore 
orchestrated the establishment of satellite organizations to broaden its 
national appeal beyond Tigray. To neutralize Amhara opposition, it 
helped set up the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM). 
In an attempt to undercut the independent OLF and gain support 
among the Oromo who make up half the country’s population, the 
TPLF also helped form the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization 
(OPDO) . . . .122 
 
The TPLF used these parties not only to bolster its legitimacy but also 
to “squelch real opposition and exclude competitors from the political 
process,”123 particularly autonomous ethnic-based parties like the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) and the All Amhara Peoples Organization 
(AAPO).124 
The Ethiopian government continues to present this Constitution to the 
international community as a social contract constituted through a 
“painstaking and participatory” democratic process.125 Many, including the 
                                                          
119. Gedion T. Hessebon, The Precarious Future of the Ethiopian Constitution, 57 J. AFR. L. 
215, 219 (2013). 
120. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Suppressing Dissent: Human Rights Abuses and Political 
Repression in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region, at 8 (May 2005), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ethiopia0505/ethiopia0505.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D9V9-VJH7] (noting that “[t]he political vacuum that was created by the 
Derg’s collapse was immediately filled by the TPLF-controlled Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition, which has remained in power through the 
present day”); see also Leonardo R. Arriola & Terrence Lyons, Ethiopia: The 100% Election, 27 J. 
DEMOCRACY 76, 76 (2016); CHRISTOPHE VAN DER BEKEN, UNITY IN DIVERSITY: FEDERALISM AS A 
MECHANISM TO ACCOMMODATE ETHNIC DIVERSITY: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA, 101-02 (2012); 
Regassa, supra note 103, at 115. 
121. See Merera Gudina, Elections and Democratization in Ethiopia, 1991-2010, 4 J. E. AFR. 
STUD. 664, 669. 
122. Makau wa Mutua, Ethiopia: An Oppressed Opposition, 38 AFR. REP. 50, 51 (Nov. 1, 1993). 
123. Id. at 50. 
124. See Jon Abbink, Breaking and Making the State: The Dynamics of Ethnic Democracy in 
Ethiopia, 13 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 149, 154-55 (1995). 
125. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 113, ¶ 8 (“During 
the transitional period, a Constitutional Drafting Commission was established. After a 
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Chairman of the Constitutional Assembly, refute these claims.126 From the 
1991 Peace Conference that led to the adoption of the Transitional Charter 
to the drafting and ratification of the 1995 Constitution by the 
Constitutional Assembly, the TPLF, through the EPRDF, dominated the 
process and dictated the terms of engagement.127 James C.N. Paul, a legal 
scholar and the founding dean of Ethiopia’s first law school, argues that the 
TPLF’s domination of the negotiations and the choice to move forward 
without opposition parties served as “an ingenious ‘divide and rule’ 
political strategy which enabled the TPLF . . . to legitimate its powers.”128 
As Professor Jon Abbink summarizes: 
 
The drafting of a new constitution, although announced as a 
democratic process whereby all the civilians would have a significant 
say, was dominated by the TGE (i.e. EPRDF) and the commission it had 
appointed. Open discussions in the k’belles (the urban dwellers’ 
associations and the peasants’ associations) did not yield substantial 
changes, nor were they meant to. The meetings themselves were only 
visited by an estimated five percent of the total population. Even so, 
they allowed for the voicing of serious criticism of the draft 
constitution, yet they made no significant impact upon the final text. 
Since the discussions started in the media and in the Constituent 
                                                          
painstaking and participatory process, a constitutional document was adopted on December 8, 
1994.”). 
126. See Ethiopia’s Constitution: Can it Stand the Test of Time, ADDIS STANDARD (Mar. 11, 
2016), http://addisstandard.com/ethiopias-constitution-can-it-stand-the-test-of-time 
[https://perma.cc/DD9Y-2Q9E] (providing the view of Dr. Negaso Gidada, Chairperson of 
the Constituent Assembly and the President who signed the final and official copy of the 
Constitution into law, that the Constiutional drafting process failed to be sufficiently inclusive, 
participatory, or democratic); see also  Regassa, supra note 103, at 115 (“Because the drafting, 
discussion, and adoption was overseen by the Transitional government which was dominated 
by the EPRDF, to that extent, the original legitimacy of the FDRE is undermined.”); Ugo 
Mattei, The New Ethiopian Constitution: First Thoughts on Ethnical Federalism and the Reception of 
Western Institutions, in TRANSPLANTS, INNOVATION, AND LEGAL TRADITION IN THE HORN OF 
AFRICA – MODELLI AUTOCTONI E MODELLI D’IMPORTAZIONE NEI SISTEMI GIURIDICI DEL CORNO 
D’AFRICA 111, 117 (Elisabetta Grande ed., 2009); Tsegaye R. Ararssa, Ethiopia’s Constitution: 
Fractured Legitimacy & The Urgency of Constitutional Transfiguration, ADDIS STANDARD (Mar. 18, 
2016), http://addisstandard.com/ethiopias-constitution-fractured-legitimacy-the-urgency-of-
constitutional-transfiguration [https://perma.cc/H4KF-2N9G] (“Designing a legitimate 
constitution requires a conducive political climate. Ours was a constitution-making process 
without a real constitutional moment. The epiphany needed to constitute oneself as a polity 
was conspicuously absent. The lack of inclusion of all the relevant political actors almost at all 
of the relevant stages, the lack of transparency of the mode of appointment to the Drafting 
Commission, the lack of free and fair election to the Constituent Assembly (that ended up 
reproducing the EPRDF dominated COR), the non-involvement of the public in a form of 
‘ratification’ (through a referendum or otherwise) marred the process to a great extent. This 
flaw in the process—coupled with disaffection in relation to the content and disregard of some 
important socio-cultural, economic and political contexts of the constitution—gave the 
constitution an unceremonious birth in a polity that was yet to be (re-) constituted into 
becoming a democracy whose state-society relation was fundamentally transfigured.”). 
127. See Regassa, supra note 103, at 115. 
128. James C.N. Paul, Ethnicity and the New Constitutional Orders of Ethiopia and Eritrea, in 
AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY 173, 189 (Yash Ghai ed., 2000). 
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Assembly, the clauses on the land law, on ‘the right to secession’ of 
disaffected ethno-regions and on some religious rights for Christians, 
proved controversial. But they were not rescinded or reformulated in 
the final version, approved in December 1994.129 
 
The exclusionary nature of this Constitutional drafting process then 
carried over into Constitutional rule.130 The TPLF, through the ERPDF, 
controlled the first election and the Constitutional Assembly, creating “de 
facto one-party rule, [and] marginalizing Amhara and Oromo 
opposition.”131 This one-party rule of a small group over the larger Oromo 
and Amhara ethnic groups has continued132 and the TPLF “remain[s] the 
strongest and dominant core of the ERPDF to date.”133 
The frequent failure of the EPRDF to respect the terms of the 
Constitution in the years since its passage is a well-documented 
phenomenon. Reports from within the United Nations134 and African 
Union135 systems, as well as reports by international NGOs 136 and 
Ethiopian civil society,137 chronicle systematic ethnic discrimination and 
grave human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detention, 
extrajudicial executions, rape in military custody, sexual violence, and 
politically-motivated prosecutions of opposition politicians and 
journalists.138 These reports have included the systematic targeting of 
several ethnic groups (in particular the Anuak, Somali, Gambella, Sidama, 
and Oromo peoples).139 Amnesty International has characterized the 
                                                          
129. Abbink, supra note 124, at 155. 
130. See Paul, supra note 128, at 189, 193-94. 
131. Id. at 187. 
132. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 100, at 22 (“In fact, Ethiopia is a one-party state, 
where government action in nearly every sphere is directed at promoting EPRDF’s political 
control, repressing opponents, and suppressing dissent. . .”). 
133. Regassa, supra note 103, at 87. 
134. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee Against 
Torture: Ethiopia, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/ETH/CO/1 (Jan. 20, 2011). 
135. See e.g., African Commission on Human & People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], 
Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the 5th and 6th Periodic Report of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (adopted at 18th Extraordinary Session, July 29 to 
Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/18th-eo/conc-obs/5-2009-
2013/concluding_observations_ethiopia_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/24TH-L7KR]. 
136. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch. Country Summary: Ethiopia (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ethiopia_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VV4-EWZJ]; 
Freedom in the World 2017: Ethiopia, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/ethiopia [https://perma.cc/H2UM-
ZKLK]. 
137. See, e.g., 140th Special Report: Stop Immediately the Extra-Judicial Killings, Illegal 
Detentions, Beatings, Intimidation and Harassment Committed by Government Security Forces!!!, 
ETH. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (March. 14, 2016), https://www.ehrco.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/140-Special-Report-English-scanned.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SVP-
2YEP]. 
138. See Human Rights Watch, Collective Punishment War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity in the Ogaden Area of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State 63 (June 2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0608webwcover.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CJ9Q-8Q5T]. 
139. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of 
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government’s repression of perceived dissent as “sweeping in its scale and 
often shocking in its brutality.”140 
Thus, while the Transitional Period Charter and the 1995 Constitution 
reflected lofty ideals of a transformed society, in reality they yielded a 
brutal system of one-party rule that cloaked the government’s domination 
under the veneer of a liberal constitution.141 This suspension of the 
Constitution and the de facto emergency that prevailed brought about a 
depoliticization of the democratic public sphere that has exacerbated 
fractures in Ethiopian society, effectively destroying what Hannah Arendt 
calls “the essential human condition of plurality, the acting and speaking 
together, which is the condition of all forms of political organization.”142 
To obscure its authoritarian practices and rationalize the continued use 
of extraordinary powers that can only be justified under conditions of 
emergency, the Ethiopian government made extensive use of two 
narratives, that of “Ethiopia Rising” and that of “National Security.” These 
two narratives—essentially Orwellian newspeaks143—helped the 
government generate and embed a set of frames, images and beliefs that 
bestow salience and credibility on the government’s policy proposals. The 
next section will explore how these narratives operate. 
IV. TWO GOVERNING NARRATIVES: “ETHIOPIA RISING” AND “NATIONAL 
                                                          
the Committee on the elimination of Racial Discrimination: Ethiopia, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/ETH/CO/15 (June 20, 2007). 
140. “Because I am Oromo”: Sweeping Repression in the Oromia Region of Ethiopia, AMNESTY 
INT’L, AI Index AFR 25/006/2014, at 7-13 (2014), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/afr250062014en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8QRU-8UHP] [hereinafter “Because I am Oromo”] (describing the brutality 
of the crackdown); see also Ethiopia ‘Ruthlessly Targeted’ Oromo Ethnic Group, Report Finds, AL 
JAZEERA AM. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/28/ethiopia-
oromo-amnesty.html [https://perma.cc/MQ2Z-CS66]. 
141. Abbink, supra note 102, at 7 (“The Constitution of 1994 . . . [is] often in contradiction 
with the governing ideology (and practices) of the EPRDF regime, which . . . relies often on 
non-constitutional techniques . . . .”). 
142. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 202 (1958) (summarizing—and agreeing 
with—arguments first put forth by Montesquieu). 
143. In George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, the Ministry of Truth implores Winston to be 
attentive to the economy of language and language’s constitutive hold over reality. The 
character in the novel encourages Winston to abandon oldspeak and acquire newspeak to 
“grasp the beauty of the destruction of words.” GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 52-
53 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1949). According to Orwell, “the whole aim of Newspeak is to 
narrow the range of thought.” Id. at 53. In newspeak land: 
You believe that reality is something objective, external, existing in its own right. You 
also believe that the nature of reality is self-evident. When you delude yourself into 
thinking that you see something, you assume that everyone else sees the same thing 
as you. But I tell you, Winston, that reality is not external. Reality exists in the human 
mind, and nowhere else. Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and 
in any case soon perishes: only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and 
immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be the truth, is truth. It is impossible to see 
reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party. That is the fact that you have 
got to relearn, Winston. It needs an act of self-destruction, an effort of the will. You 
must humble yourself before you can become sane. 
Id. at 252. 
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SECURITY” 
Ethiopia’s government has made extensive use of two interdependent 
governing narratives—”Ethiopia Rising” and “National Security”—to 
justify many of its practices. Ethiopia Rising paints an image of a country 
undergoing an economic renaissance and frames the ruling party as 
committed to lifting millions out of poverty through development. National 
Security frames Ethiopia as “an island of stability in a troubled region,” 
whose peace and security is being threatened by nefarious elements from 
within and abroad. 144145 
In Governing Narratives: Symbolic Politics and Policy Change, Hugh Miller 
demonstrates how such narratives of public policy discourse acquire their 
coherence, credibility, and salience.146 Miller explains that public policy 
discourse and the performance of the public interest are both political147 
and fraught with symbolic meaning.148 Miller’s analysis deconstructs 
governing narratives into signs, ideographs, and narratives.149 Ideographs 
are “constellation[s] of connotations capable of generating meaningful 
coherence, especially when tied together with story lines into a policy 
narrative.”150 Those who deploy ideographs intentionally utilize existing 
connotations that fit their ideological goals, incorporating local, historical, 
and cultural contexts.151 The resulting symbols are powerful, “pull[ing] 
together multiple signs, references, and images to signify an understanding 
that is imbued with cognition, emotional resonance, situational awareness, 
                                                          
144. Reed Kramer, Ethiopian Prime Minister: ‘We Are an Island of Stability in A Troubled 
Region,’ THE GUARDIAN (Mr. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2016/mar/09/ethiopian-prime-minister-hailemariam-desalegn-island-of-
stability-troubled-region [https://perma.cc/66JQ-S6NN]. 
145. In reality, however, these narratives operate in contingent and complex ways to 
embody a set of carefully crafted expectations, ideations and practices to amplify one policy 
position over another, ultimately depoliticizing society and intensifying state power. 
146. See generally HUGH MILLER, GOVERNING NARRATIVES: SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND POLICY 
CHANGE (2012). 
147. Id. at 61 (“In practice, public administration and politics are tightly intertwined, and it 
would be wrong to think of administration as politically neutral or policy free. In discourse 
theory, politics is inherent in the contestable vocabularies used in the organization, the 
practices that have been adopted that might one day be changed, the techniques utilized, and 
the narratives that dominate or are challenged. Operations inside the organization are 
inherently political and, moreover, the external politics never goes away.”). 
148. Id. at 92 (“Narratives and their ideography are connotative and holistic, important not 
for their denotative precision so much as their integration of meaning into a form of coherence. 
Meanings can be changed, through new or altered associations among signs, ideographs, and 
narratives. When meanings change, the symbiotic relations between narrative and practice 
changes the way tasks are accomplished or understood. The legitimacy and appropriateness of 
social practices change when meanings change.”). 
149. See id. at 4-9. 
150. Id. at 3. Miller’s use of ideographs builds on the work of Michael C. McGee. Id. at 3-4. 
McGee’s work is very explicit about the ideological elements of ideographs. “[An ideograph] is 
a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and 
ill-defined normative goal.” Michael C. McGee, The “Ideograph”: A Link between Rhetoric and 
Ideology, 66 Q.J. SPEECH 1, 15 (1980). 
151. MILLER, supra note 146, at 5. 
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and values.”152 
Narratives of public policy can be understood as the weaving together 
of ideographs as parts of “story lines and arguments”153 that shape a 
broader narrative.154 But  narratives can transcend their symbolic elements 
or particular instantiations: Narratives can shape identity, express 
affirmations or condemnations of values, promote an “us versus them” 
mentality, suggest heroes and villains, stoke particular emotions, capture 
metaphorical meaning, and guide individuals to take particular political 
actions.155 As Miller explains, the political actions sought through these 
narratives can be those seeking change or those defending institutions and 
the status quo.156 Furthermore, governing narratives can legitimate 
proposed public policy as necessary for social “order and regularity.”157 
The Ethiopia Rising and National Security narratives incorporate 
several ordinary-language ideographs.158 The Ethiopian government 
deploys terms like “terrorism,” the “war on terror,” “anti-peace,” 
“developmental democracy,” “poverty reduction,” “anti-development,” 
and “rent-seekers” to pursue an assortment of economic and military 
objects that conceal or suppress the structural anomalies at the heart of the 
Ethiopian multinational federal experiment. As I explain below, such 
resonant ideographs, as elements of Ethiopian governing narratives, 
institutionalize and normalize the current government’s authoritarian grip 
on society and  give it a rather vast field of maneuver. These narratives 
depoliticize society, widen social gaps, justify the government’s use of 
violent repression,159 and entrench the power of “an unquestioned political 
elite which ‘is always right.’”160 
The mobilization of these narratives and their respective ideographs 
evoke emotional responses that can arouse people’s passions, flatter their 
apprehensions, and move them to action. These narratives call upon the 
people to feel love for the nation and also to feel injured by those who 
deviate from the vision of change set out by the ruling party. In this way, 
these narratives function to align society with key ideological and 
institutional pillars of the developmental state. In sum, these governing 
narratives deepen, legitimize, and sustain a de facto state of emergency in 
                                                          
152. Id. at 91. 
153. Id. at 5. 
154. Id. at 7. 
155. Id. at 7-8. 
156. Id. at 67-71. 
157. Id. at 67 (“Public policy is often itself an attempt to marshal order and regularity for a 
society. Public policy making explicitly reveals knowledge, rationales, and operations that 
justify, explain, and legitimate the prevailing regime of social practices. Indeed, these are the 
functions of policy discourse. Proposals to change those same legitimately established 
practices are also justified and legitimated through a discursive policy process.”). 
158. See McGee, supra note 150, at 15 (noting that “an ideograph is an ordinary-language 
term found in political discourse.”). 
159. See id. (“[An ideograph] warrants the use of power, excuses behaviour and belief, 
which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behaviour and belief 
into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable.”). 
160. Abbink, supra note 102, at 16. 
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Ethiopia. 
A. The “Ethiopia Rising” Narrative 
Economic development has always been a central aspect of the 
EPRDF’s claims of legitimacy. Meles Zenawi, the EPRDF’s ideological 
beacon who led Ethiopia from the fall of the Derg until his death in 2012, 
argued that the primary objectives of his leadership was ensuring rapid 
economic growth and tackling poverty.161 A fierce critic of the neoliberal 
Washington Consensus and its prescriptions, Prime Minister Zenawi 
rejected the sovereignty of the market and unregulated free enterprise, 
mounting a vigorous defense of the developmental state model in which 
“an activist state . . . will allocate state rents in a productive manner.”162 
Central to Zenawi’s model of a “developmental state” is the belief in 
the primacy of economic development and the subsidiary nature of political 
freedoms. For Zenawi’s “developmental state” project, economic 
development is nothing less than an existential challenge: “I am convinced 
that we will cease to exist as a nation unless we grow fast and share our 
growth.”163 In his view, economic development also brings with it the social 
capital which is a prerequisite for political freedom and democracy.164 As he 
put it, “there is no sustainable democracy in a society characterized by 
pervasive rent seeking. We need value creation to be dominant for there to 
be a foundation for democracy, for politics to be more than a zero sum 
game, a competition to control state rents.”165 
Although Zenawi dismissed the democratic ideals and policy 
prescriptions of neoliberal institutions and western donors, his government 
nonetheless became one of their most popular partners. Ethiopia remains 
the leading recipient of official development assistance in sub-Saharan 
Africa166 and has entered into deep partnerships with multilateral 
institutions like the World Bank167 and private foundations like the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation.168 Much of this success has to do with Zenawi’s 
ability to market his government and practices to the world, largely by 
                                                          
161. Alex de Waal, The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi, 112 AFR. AFF. 148, 150-51 (2012). 
162. Id. at 148, 152. 
163. Id. at 154. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 153-154. 
166. World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received 
(Current US $), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD 
[https://perma.cc/6KHF-NLCK]. 
167. See, e.g., Eth. Country Mgmt. Unit, World Bank Group, Country Partnership Strategy for 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://documents.worldbank.ofrg/curated/en/561281468031489534/pdf/718840CAS0P1300s
e0Only090Box370115B.pdf [https://perma.cc/EU69-RFUR]. 
168. See Press Release, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Ethiopia: Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation Confirms Long Term Commitment and Partnership for Development with 
Ethiopia (Nov 18, 2015), available at Ethiopia: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Confirms Long 
Term Commitment and Partnership for Development with Ethiopia, ALLAFRICA (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201511180859.html [https://perma.cc/W4S3-75UB]. 
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telling the West what it wants to hear.169 For instance, at least on paper, he 
has made it appear that this development model is working quite well:GDP 
growth has averaged over 10% for the past decade, while the poverty rate 
was nearly halved between 2000 and 2011.170 Additionally, as the World 
Bank outlines, 
 
[o]ver the past two decades . . . primary school enrollments have 
quadrupled, child mortality has been cut in half, and the number of 
people with access to clean water has more than doubled. These gains, 
together with more recent moves to strengthen the fight against malaria 
and HIV/AIDs, paint a picture of improved well-being in Ethiopia.”171 
 
The EPRDF operationalizes the development state through a hybrid of 
centralized state planning (a holdover of the Derg’s model of governance) 
and decentralized program administration. Starting with the 1993 
Agricultural Development Led Industrialization Strategy, the government 
has published national-level plans, typically on five-year increments, that 
outline economic development priorities for the nation and dedicate the 
resources to accomplishing them.172 The most recent two five-year plans are 
known as Growth and Transformation Plans I and II (GTPs I and II), with 
GTP II covering the 2015 to 2020 period.173 
In a country where roughly 80% of the population lives in rural areas,174 
a core aspect of the government’s national development strategy is its 
agenda for “agriculture and rural transformation,” by which it aims to 
increase the productivity of Ethiopia’s agriculture sector and to better 
connect agricultural products to commercial outlets.175 In order to execute 
this and other ambitious development objectives, the Ethiopian 
                                                          
169. For an example of Zenawi’s abilities in this area, see Magnus Taylor, Diary: The Meles 
Zenawi Show – World Economic Forum on Africa, 2012, AFRICAN ARGUMENTS (May 15, 2012), 
http://africanarguments.org/2012/05/15/diary-the-meles-zenawi-show-the-world-
economic-forum-on-africa-2012-by-magnus-taylor [https://perma.cc/7H48-YXWM]. 
170. World Bank Group, Economic Overview – Ethiopia (Apr. 24, 2017), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview [https://perma.cc/63LF-34SN]. 
171. Id. 
172. See Davide Chinigò & Emanuele Fantini, Thermidor in Ethiopia? Agrarian 
Transformations Between Economic Liberalization and the Developmental State, 31 ECHOGÉO 1, 9-10 
(2015) (outlining the various agricultural development plans, starting with the 1993 ADLI 
strategy); see also Agricultural Transformation Agenda Progress Report: Covering 2011-2015 in the 
GTP 1 Period, ETH. AGIRC. TRANSFORMATION AGENCY, at 20 (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.ata.gov.et/download/agricultural-transformation-agenda-progress-report-gtp-
i2011-15/# [https://perma.cc/V8V7-UJBP] [hereinafter ATA Progress Report] (providing an 
overview of the past few decades’ national strategic plans and, specifically, their agricultural 
development components); Nat’l Planning Comm’n, Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) 
2015/16-2019/20, FED. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA (May 2016), 
http://dagethiopia.org/new/docstation/com_content.article/100/gtpii__english_translation
__final__june_21_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BBT-5TWV] [hereinafter GTP II]. 
173. See GTP II, supra note 172, at ix. 
174. World Bank Group, Rural Population (% of Total Population), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS [https://perma.cc/4NC4-7BQC]. 
175. GTP II, supra note 172, at 120. 
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government has created a vast administrative infrastructure, with programs 
aimed at improving agricultural practices, access to inputs, storage, grower 
marketing power, and commercial linkages.176 Other programs have aimed 
to attract large-scale commercial investors with an eye toward generating 
much needed foreign exchange through export to international buyers.177 
For instance, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), aimed at 
reducing chronic food insecurity through direct cash or food transfers, has 
been found to both improve food security178 and stimulate rural 
economies.179 Other programs, such as agricultural hotlines, input voucher 
systems, and a fertilizer information system, have increased agricultural 
yields and improved the livelihoods of involved farmers.180 
While these programs have helped to sustain double-digit economic 
growth and have generated international acclaim, they have also proven 
potent tools of social control. A 2010 Human Rights Watch report based on 
more than 200 interviews in several regions and covering a wide cross-
section of Ethiopian society found that “[t]he government has used donor-
supported programs, salaries, and training opportunities as political 
weapons to control the population, punish dissent, and undermine political 
opponents—both real and perceived. Local officials deny these people 
access to seeds and fertilizer, agricultural land, credit, food aid, and other 
resources for development.”181 Typically, this politicization of government 
programs has taken place at the local level (known as the “kebele”), where 
provision of government services, access to inputs, or membership in 
cooperatives has been conditioned upon EPRDF membership.182 Those 
unwilling to join the party or already suspected of being opposition 
supporters are framed as anti-development or “rent-seekers.”183 Other 
                                                          
176. See ATA Progress Report, supra note 172, at 34-43 (outlining all agricultural 
“deliverables” from the GTP I period); see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 100, at 4 
(providing further detail on a broader subset of rural programs—extending beyond just 
agricultural development—and outlining how they have been used as tools of repression by 
the EPRDF). 
177. See Editorial, Ethiopia: Promoting Agricultural Investment for Economic Growth, ETH. 
HERALD (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.ethpress.gov.et/herald/index.php/editorial-view-
point/item/3832-promoting-agricultural-investment-for-economic-growth 
[https://perma.cc/6HST-LSND] (providing a broad overview of commercial agriculture in 
Ethiopia); see also ATA Progress Report, supra note 172, at 9 (crediting agriculture with 84% of 
Ethiopia’s export earnings). 
178. See World Bank Group, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) – Integrating 
Disaster and Climate Risk Management, at 15 (Jun. 2013), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/893931468321850632/pdf/806220WP0P12680B
ox0379812B00PUBLIC0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3V6-EK3W]. 
179. See Mateusz Filipski et al., Synopsis: Economy-Wide Impacts of the Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP), INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INST. (2016), 
http://www.ifpri.org/cdmref/p15738coll2/id/130466/filename/130677.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/STW9-AGRB]. 
180. ATA Progress Report, supra note 172, at 35-43. 
181. Id. at 4. 
182. See id. at 47-48. 
183. Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 100, at 50 n. 161 (“The EPRDF frequently 
refers to opposition parties derogatorily as ‘rent seekers,’ meaning supporters of a liberal 
economic system in which an upper class seeks rents from the labor of the poor.”). 
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sources have largely corroborated those claims.184 Davide Chinigò and 
Emanuele Fantini summarize these dynamics as “agricultural 
commercialization . . . underpinned by a project of social engineering with 
clear political objectives.”185 
Despite these clearly discriminatory practices, the Ethiopian 
government has remained a top recipient of foreign development 
assistance.186 That continued international support in a large part traces to 
the government’s unique ability to camouflage its political practices behind 
the technocratic language of development agencies and by framing 
complex, multidimensional questions, with real ethnic and redistributive 
consequences, as focused only on simple, uncontroversial objectives, like 
poverty reduction. Anthropologist James Ferguson observed a similar 
depoliticization of development during his study of Lesotho in the early 
1980s, finding: 
 
By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by 
promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and 
oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of ‘development’ is the 
principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized 
in the world today. At the same time, by making the intentional 
blueprints for ‘development’ so highly visible, a ‘development’ project 
can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations 
involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power 
almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which 
no one can object.187 
 
This language is amply on display in Ethiopia’s Growth and 
Transformation Plans, which reduce the entire government’s activities to a 
combination of development jargon and quantifiable “targets.”188 These 
plans sanitize questionable categories of activities (given the government’s 
track record), using such ideographs as “developmental good governance 
                                                          
184. See Luis Flores, Development Aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking Violence, Marginalization, and 
Political Repression, OAKLAND INSTITUTE (2013), 
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Brief_Development_
Aid_Ethiopia.pdf [https://perma.cc/35T6-WAFE] (summarizing evidence of repression 
through development programs, as reported by a variety of sources). 
185. Chinigò & Fantini, supra note 172, at 10. 
186. Sorting by 2015 recipients, the World Bank Group lists Ethiopia as the fourth largest 
recipient of “net official development assistance and official aid received” in current U.S. 
dollars. World Bank Group, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received 
(Current US$) (sorting by 2015 figure), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?year_high_desc=true 
[https://perma.cc/GK3Y-SY3N]. 
187. JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE 256 (1994). 
188. QSee, e.g., Nat’l Planning Comm’n, Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) (2015/16 
– 2019/20) – Volume 2 Policy Matrix, FED. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPA (July 2016), 
http://dagethiopia.org/new//docstation/com_content.article/100/gtp_ii_policy_matrix_eng
lish_final__august_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WS2-JM5B] (reducing each objective of GTP 
II to a set of quantifiable, annual targets). 
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and building a democratic system” and “human development and 
technology capacity building.”189 Other reports from the World Bank, 
USAID, and Ethiopia echo this language, framing the programs they 
support as largely apolitical.190 
In order to embark on this social engineering, the EPRDF has 
increasingly localized implementation responsibilities for some of its key 
programs, which allows it to better harness government resources as tools 
of political control.191 At first glance, many of these programs may sound 
innocuous. For instance, one uses Ethiopia’s sizeable agricultural extension 
resources to train a set of “model farmers” who are then paired with five 
other peasants. The idea is that those model farmers can share their new 
knowledge with other farmers and facilitate their access to inputs.192 The 
problem, however, is that these “model farmers” are typically either party 
members or closely affiliated to it.193 These “model farmers” represent the 
last link in a long chain that ties peasant farmers to the EPRDF’s ideological 
leadership.194 As René Lefort outlines in his study of “model farmers,” 
delegation of power to local officials and, in turn, to “model farmers” 
occurs in a manner that leaves little room for interpretation. He describes 
the “developmental state in practice” as operating, at least in part, as 
follows: 
 
Local officials almost universally regard the vast majority of the 
peasants as ‘backward,’ ‘uneducated’ and even ‘like disabled persons.’ 
This attitude bolsters a strictly top-down approach, and, contrary to the 
official credo, precludes any form of participatory approach. Decisions 
taken at the top, and which middle-ranking and local officials must 
endorse, are deliberately presented in a maximalist manner, leaving a 
small margin for ‘discussion’ with those that are implicated, so that 
they can be scaled down and become less excessive. This marginal 
negotiation process, where only the means of implementation are 
partially up for discussion, allows the authorities to claim that the final 
decisions have been taken ‘by the people.’ 195 
                                                          
189. GTP II, supra note 172, at ii-iv. 
190. For examples of how such programs are framed apolitically, see generally Ethiopia 
Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2011 -2016: Accelerating the Tranformation Toward 
Prosperity, USAID (Mar. 2012), 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Ethiopia_CDCS_June_2017.pd
f [https://perma.cc/CT2R-VTBT]; Eth. Country Mgmt. Unit, supra note 167; ATA Progress 
Report, supra note 172,. 
191. Human Rights Watch notes that 
The linking of livelihoods to political affiliation has been part of an overarching 
EPRDF strategy since the 2005 electoral debacle, when the party underestimated 
support for the opposition. The EPRDF multiplied its membership from 700,000 in 
2005 to over 5 million by 2010 (one in seven of the adult population). 
Human Rights Watch, supra note 100, at 67. 
192. Chinigò & Fantini, supra note 172, at 6-7. 
193. Id. 
194. See id. at 6 (“Model farmers are linked to the party structure.”). 
195. René Lefort, Free Market Economy, “Development State” and Party-Stage Hegemony in 
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Thus, while ERPDF’s policies appear decentralized, these policies 
ultimately help to reinforce streamlined, top-down decision-making and 
political control. 
Decentralization has proven popular among aid agencies, who have 
framed such local control as a way of bypassing the authoritarian central 
government and placing control over programs in the hands of those who 
are more directly “accountable” to local citizens.196 In fact, after the World 
Bank and the rest of the Development Assistance Group (DAG) suspended 
direct federal budget support in response to the government’s crackdown 
in the wake of the 2005 election, they shifted their funds into a new, locally-
administered program called Protection of Basic Services (PBS).197 The 
problem, of course, was that, while these programs were administrated at 
the local level, local politicians took their orders from the EPRDF’s national 
leaders.198 Accordingly, the PBS program made it harder to track funds 
while accomplishing little else. As Human Rights Watch explains, “[w]hile 
Ethiopia’s national government created the repressive policies, district 
governments actually implemented them; meanwhile foreign donors found 
it hard to monitor and detect misuse of funds at the local level.”199 
Moreover, the “Ethiopia Rising” narrative also served as a powerful 
instrument of disabling democratic organizing and collective mobilization. 
By adopting ambitious development plans such as the five-year GTPs and 
embarking on highly visible development projects such as the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the largest hydro-electric plant in 
Africa, the government embraced a pan-Ethiopian nationalist rhetoric to 
lure a numerically vital constituency.200 Contra the politics of identity and 
difference that were recognized—and, in fact, celebrated, by the 
Constitution’s model of multinational federalism201—the GERD and 
projects like it represent a move towards a pan-Ethiopian nationalism with 
wider “Neo-Pan-Africanist ideals of renaissance.”202 As one commentator 
writes in the blog Horn Affairs: 
                                                          
Ethiopia: The Case of the “Model Farmers,” 50 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 681, 695 (2012). Lefort goes 
on to discuss how the “mission of the developmental state is fulfilled by the ruling party and 
not the state, despite its title…. The main feature of the developmental state is that it mobilises 
the peasant in his capacity as ‘vanguard’ to an infinitely greater extent than as model farmer.” 
Id. at 695-696. 
196. See, e.g., Social Protection Sector, World Bank Group, Improving Basic Services for the 
Bottom Forty Percent – Lessons from Ethiopia: Results of the Poverty and Social Impact Assessment of 
Decentralized Basic Service Delivery in Ethiopia (2014), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/17838/842150WP0P14950V
ersion0of0PBS0PSIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR9Q-EJR3]. 
197. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 100, at 19-22. 
198. See id. at 66-68. 
199. Id. at 20-21. 
200. Dalia Abdelhad et al., The Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Is There a 
Meeting Point between Nationalism and Hydrosolidarity?, 155 J. CONTEMP. WATER RESEARCH & 
EDUC. 73, 74 (2015). 
201. See discussion in supra Part II. 
202. Dalia Abdelhad at al., supra note 200, at 74. 
DRAFT: NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR CITATION.  11/6/2017  11:10 AM 
162 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. 19 
 
We should tell everyone—both at home and abroad—that when it 
comes to [the GERD], either you are with our humiliation or our 
salvation! This is why anyone who threatens our dam—our salvation, 
our future Ethiopia—should be reminded, time and again, that “no one 
who has tried that has lived to tell the story!”203 
 
This narrative of national humiliation, which echoes the broader 
“Ethiopia Rising” narrative, draws on ideographs complete with historical 
references—national pride, national humiliation, national disappointment, 
national renaissance, and national salvation—to evoke emotional and moral 
responses. These ideographs, which in turn depend on existing historical 
and cultural repertoires, speak of Ethiopia’s lost age of glory, of Axumite 
civilization and the cradle of humanity, of the victories of its kings over 
European colonial powers, and other hegemonic articulations of Ethiopian 
history, each brimming with associations and implications. By embedding 
these ideographs into its narrative about the resurgent developmental state 
that is driving fast economic growth to wipe out the humiliation of the old 
and restore its lost historical eminence, the government has transformed the 
“Ethiopia Rising” narrative into an imperative.204 Furthermore, the 
government has justified authoritarian developmental policies on the 
grounds that a threat to the country’s developmental programs is more 
than just a national humiliation: it constitutes a threat to Ethiopia’s national 
survival.As one commentator notes, “[a]ny threat to the GERD is no less 
than an active invasion on our nation.”205 
Although the use of development discourses as a tool of legitimation is 
not a particularly Ethiopian phenomenon, few countries have been as 
successful as Ethiopia in garnering international support for such efforts. 
                                                          
203. Merkeb Negash, Renaissance Dam’s Unnoticed Impact on Ethiopian Psyche, HORN AFF. 
(May 18, 2013), http://hornaffairs.com/2013/05/18/nile-renaissance-dam-impact-ethiopian-
psyche [https://perma.cc/SV32-MRJL]. Prime Minster Zenawi himself took a hard line on 
foreign opponents to the project: 
I am not a believer in conspiracy theories but if I were I would conclude that these 
people want Africa to remain as it currently is with all its misery and poverty so that 
they can come and visit nature in its pristine state in the winter every so often. 
Daniel Berhane, ‘Hydropower Extremists Borderline Criminal’ – Text of Meles Zenawi speech at 
Hydro-power Conference, HORN AFF. (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://hornaffairs.com/2011/04/01/hydropower-extremists-borderline-criminal-text-of-
meles-zenawi-speech-at-hydro-power-conference-un-eca [https://perma.cc/K3FZ-K7CH]. 
Zenawi went on to call those who opposed such projects as “borderline criminal.” Id.; see also 
Barry Malone, Ethiopia PM Says Anti-Dam Groups Keep Africa Poor, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-ethiopia-dam-
idAFJOE72U0V720110331[https://perma.cc/WM5E-PB4K] (summarizing the speech and 
replicating the cited quotes). 
204. For a very useful summary of the ways in which The Reporter, an Ethiopian daily 
newspaper, framed the narratives around the GERD, see generally Yeshiwas Degu Belay, Mass 
Media in Nile Politics: The Reporter Coverage of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, 4 J. MASS 
COMMUNICATION & JOURNALISM (2014). 
205. Negash, supra note 203. 
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As the largest aid recipient in sub-Saharan Africa,206 Ethiopia under Zenawi 
(and now under Desalegn) has largely been able to set the terms of foreign 
assistance. As one European official remarked to Human Rights Watch, 
“[o]ften we all say, ‘what are we doing supporting this government? We 
should get out.’ But no one is going to leave. What is the alternative? They 
have made good strides on the Millennium Development Goals—we help 
them with that, but it is a big compromise.”207 Thus, despite the 
government’s well-known and well-documented abuses, the “Ethiopia 
Rising” narrative entrenches the EPRDF’s power and substantiates its 
international legitimacy. 
In sum, Ethiopia’s development narrative operates in complex ways, at 
several levels of society. Internationally, it mobilizes international aid, 
which the government then funnels to serve simultaneous political and 
developmental ends. Nationally, megaprojects galvanize nationalist 
sentiments and result in an “othering” of those who do not support such 
projects. And locally, the government’s firm grip on land, inputs, and other 
key monopolies – holdovers from the Derg’s Marxist reign – combined with 
local officials’ discretion in allocating development funds, weaponize 
development programs, even while such programs are communicated back 
to donors in benign, technocratic terms. Furthermore, at all levels of society, 
this development narrative creates a dichotomous relationship between 
those aligned with the party and therefore in favor of economic 
development and those who are against the party and therefore anti-
developmental “rent-seekers.” 
B. The “National Security” Narrative 
While the “Ethiopia Rising” Narrative has proven to be a powerful 
approach to generating domestic and international legitimacy, national 
security has perhaps proven an even more potent tool in the government’s 
attempts to legitimize its extra-legal powers. 
The “National Security” narrative casts the Ethiopian state as an oasis 
of stability in a cauldron of fire. Under this view, Ethiopia is surrounded by 
fragile states that could descend into chaos, becoming safe havens for 
extremists committed to destroying Ethiopia’s peace and tranquility. 
Framed as such, the narrative situates Ethiopia within the ideography of 
the Global War on Terror and the good versus evil framework within which 
the values, images, connotations, and meanings associated with terrorism 
are enacted and institutionalized. Within this framework, “terrorists” are 
fundamentalist zealots who are out to destroy Western civilization and the 
landscape of rights and freedoms. The “terrorist,” whatever the motivation, 
is an embodiment of evil and a harbinger of much greater chaos. 
By casting terrorism and terrorists as an undifferentiated and cohesive 
                                                          
206. World Bank Group, supra note 186. 
207. Human Rights Watch, supra note 100, at 69. 
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whole motivated by a singular apocalyptic vision of the world, the 
narrative embeds fear and endorses the view that “to defeat evil, we may 
have to traffic in evils.”208 In this way, the “National Security” narrative 
mobilizes the Global War on Terror to provide salience and credibility to its 
repressive goals, leaving Ethiopians and the West with the stark choice of 
either accepting political repression or risking an onslaught of violent 
extremism. 
As the war on terror became a centrepiece of American foreign policy, 
governments around the world began to situate their own internal and 
regional conflicts within the conceptual and ideological structure of the war 
on terror.209 This is particularly true of authoritarian countries, where 
democratic institutions are either non-existent or integrated into the 
executive arm of the state. Building on the writings of Agamben and 
Foucault, Saul Newman and Michael Levine observe the effects of this 
proliferation and appropriation of the discourse of terrorism: 
 
‘The war on terror’ has to be seen as a total war: not only an external 
war directed at shadowy terrorist groups, but also an internal war that 
has as its aim the control, regulation and surveillance of populations. 
Rhetoric and innuendo endeavour to see to it, when advantageous, that 
the two aims are perceived as coalescing.210 
 
To Newman and Levine, this discourse has a hegemonic nature, with 
states constantly evoking this “anti-terror” logic to justify increasingly 
repressive actions: 
 
The ‘war on terror’ has become a hegemonic discourse in which we are 
all potentially implicated: not only as targets of terrorist attacks, but 
also as potential terrorists ourselves (terrorists ‘living in our midst’). 
The response of governments to this perceived terrorist threat is to 
evoke the logic and rhetoric of the state of siege/state of war at every 
turn.211 
 
As the U.S.-led war intensified in scope and magnitude, Ethiopia began 
to appropriate the categories, connotations, and symbols associated with 
the Global War on Terror to legitimize, vindicate, and affirm the power and 
authority of the state.212 Prime Minister Zenawi made no secret of the 
                                                          
208. Michel Ignatieff, Lesser Evils, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 2, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/02/magazine/lesser-evils.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZAM4-L5MD]. 
209. Michael Levine & Saul Newman, Sacred Cows and the Changing Face of Discourse on 
Terrorism: Cranking it Up a Notch, 10 INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 359, 365 (2006). 
210. See Newman & Levine, supra note 72, at 23. 
211. Id. at 26. 
212. For a detailed account of how Ethiopia used its anti-terrorism laws and the anti-
terrorism discourse more generally, see Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Law: A Tool to Stifle Dissent, 
OAKLAND INST. & ENVTL. DEFENDER LAW CENT. (2015), 
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Ethiopia_Legal_Brief
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advantages that this Global War on Terror provided him, at one point 
telling U.S. Senator Arlen Specter that it was “something of a godsend.”213 
For Zenawi and his government, the “National Security” narrative served 
two broad policy objectives. First, it created opportunities for deeper 
strategic partnership with the U.S. and the broader West, enabling it to 
access enormous technological, diplomatic, and financial resources in the 
name of counterterrorism. As the U.S.-led proxy war against al-Shabab and 
other terrorist groups in East Africa expanded, Ethiopia’s longstanding 
relationship with the U.S. entered a new phase, with the National Security 
Agency (NSA) establishing “a network of clandestine eavesdropping 
outposts designed to listen in on the communications of Ethiopians and 
their neighbors across the Horn of Africa in the name of counter-
terrorism.”214 In 2002, the NSA set up the Deployed Signals Intelligence 
Operations Center in Addis Ababa, conducting mission from “12 
workstations.”215 By 2005, the operation had expanded to “46 
multifunctional workstations”, involving US military personnel and three 
remote sites based outside Addis Ababa.216 The intelligence cooperation, in 
which Ethiopia supplies local knowledge and its strategic location in return 
for “technology and training integral to electronic surveillance,” was so 
vital for both countries that, in 2011, the U.S. Air Force ‘upgraded’ an 
airfield in the South of the country to fly armed drones on counterterrorism 
missions.217 
When Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006, it billed the invasion as a 
global counter-terrorism operation.218 State Department cables published on 
Wikileaks show that such an explanation is, at best, incomplete; Ethiopia’s 
ongoing proxy war with Eritrea provided significant impetus to carry out 
the invasion.219 Professor Alex de Waal, a prominent authority on the Horn 
                                                          
_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBU2-UDVS]; see also Amnesty Int’l, Ethiopia: End Use of 
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213. ELIZA GRISWOLD, THE TENTH PARALLEL 128 (2010). 
214. Nich Turse, How the NSA Built A Secret Surveillance Network For Ethiopia, THE 
INTERCEPT (Sep. 13, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/09/13/nsa-ethiopia-surveillance-
human-rights [https://perma.cc/4NC2-XEWG]. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Craig Whitlock, Air Force Flying Missions From Drone Base in Ethiopia, WASH. POST (Oct. 
28, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-drone-base-in-
ethiopia-is-operational/2011/10/27/gIQAznKwMM_story.html [https://perma.cc/FQB7-
ALDL]. Note that the United States closed the base in early 2016. Craig Whitlock, Pentagon 
Shutters African Drone Base, Moves Aircraft to Other Hotspots, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/04/pentagon-shutters-
african-drone-base-moves-aircraft-to-other-hotspots [https://perma.cc/QRD3-46MZ]. 
218. See Alex de Waal, Why Obama’s $5 Billion Counterterrorism Fund Will Actually Support 
Terrorism, BOS. REV.: BLOG (Jun. 11, 2014), http://bostonreview.net/blog/alex-de-waal-
obamas-5-billion-counterterrorism-fund [https://perma.cc/AXG6-G3ZV]. 
219. See Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Choosing Sides in the Horn of Africa: Wikileaks, the Ethiopia 
Imperative, and American Responses to Post-9/11 Regional Conflicts, 23 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT 
704, 712-23 (2012) (recounting, through analysis of State Department cables, the discussions, 
DRAFT: NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR CITATION.  11/6/2017  11:10 AM 
166 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. 19 
of Africa, concludes that the United States “bought the [counter-terrorism] 
ruse and ended up as partner and sponsor in a military mission.”220As the 
security partnership and intelligence-sharing arrangements between the 
U.S. and regional allies deepened, policymakers in Western capitals began 
to view the country as a critical partner on the front line,221 making it one of 
the key beneficiaries of both the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund and 
the State Department’s East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative.222  
The partnership provided Ethiopia with the financial and technical 
resources to build its own surveillance infrastructure to carry out its own 
intelligence operations at home and abroad.223 In its report titled They Know 
Everything We Do, Human Rights Watch notes that the country “has 
acquired some of the world’s most advanced surveillance technologies” 
since 2010.224 In a country in which “essentially anyone that opposes or 
expresses dissent against the government is considered to be an ‘anti-
peace element’ or a ‘terrorist,’” this technology is not merely used to fight 
terrorism.225 It is also an integral element of the country’s architecture of 
repression. Together with the government’s complete monopoly over 
telecom and internet services, these capabilities have enabled the 
surveillance and monitoring of the political opposition and critical voices at 
home and abroad.226 
In short, the Global War on Terror has provided an ideological and 
normative cover for a specifically Ethiopian narrative of “terrorism” in 
which oppressive political agendas are synchronized with the law to justify 
the government’s increasingly violent exercise of power. The 2009 Anti-
Terrorism Proclamation (ATP)227 represents the pinnacle of Ethiopia’s 
deployment of the “National Security” narrative as an instrument of de-
                                                          
policies, and considerations that led to Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion of Somalia). 
220. De Waal, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
221. LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.. R41473, COUNTERING TERRORISM IN EAST 
AFRICA: THE U.S. RESPONSE 47-48 (Nov. 3, 2010) (“With one of the largest standing armies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia’s relative strength and its active counterterrorism role have led 
the U.S. government to view it as a key ally in a turbulent region.”). 
222. See Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund – Department of Defense Budget (Fiscal Year 2017), 
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) (Feb. 2016), 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_CTPF_J-
Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULV4-XRBJ] (outlining the fund’s budget for East Africa, 
identifying Ethiopia as a recipient, and listing key activities to be funded); see also PLOCH, supra 
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 23-26, 47-48 (outlining multilateral and bilateral 
support programs to Ethiopia). 
223. See Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund – Department of Defense Budget (Fiscal Year 2017), 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 5-7. 
224. Human Rights Watch, They Know Everything We Do: Telecom and Internet Surveillance in 
Ethiopia, at 3 (2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0314_ForUpload_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H53H-PPH2]. 
225. Nick Turse, supra note 214 (quoting Felix Horne, Senior Researcher on Ethiopia and 
Eritrea at Human Rights Watch). 
226. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 224,  at 1-4; see also id. at 34-87 (describing these 
measures in greater detail). 
227. Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 [ATP], FED. NEGARIT GAZETA, 15th Year, 
No. 57 (Aug. 28, 2009). 
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legitimization and political repression. The law gives the police and 
security forces sweeping new powers and effectively suspends core 
constitutional guarantees and fundamental human rights recognized by 
international human rights treaties ratified by Ethiopia.228 One of the 
Proclamation’s most worrying features is its overly broad definition of 
“terrorist acts” which includes not just violent acts but also peaceful 
protests that might “endanger . . . any public service” or the provision of 
“moral support” to terrorist groups.229 Additionally, the law appears to 
proscribe broad swaths of political and non-political speech; to effectively 
(if not explicitly) legalize the use of torture to extract evidence; to allow for 
the admission of hearsay, indirect evidence, and anonymous intelligence 
reports as evidence in court proceedings; to give security forces virtually 
unlimited power to conduct warrantless searches; and to grant judges 
broad discretion in sentencing those found guilty of terrorist acts (including 
use of the death penalty).230 
Although a detailed analysis of the constitutionality of the ATP is 
beyond the scope of this Article, most, if not all, of the features mentioned 
above are inconsistent with the plain language of the Constitution and the 
principles of human rights treaties it incorporates by reference in Article 
13.231 In practice, the government’s actions pursuant to the ATP make this 
contradiction with the Constitution and human rights principles even more 
obvious: under the pretext of “fighting terrorism,” the regime has 
prosecuted and convicted several opposition leaders, religious leaders, 
activists, journalists, and bloggers.232 According to the Ethiopia Trial 
Tracker, at least 765 individuals have been charged with terrorism since 
2009.233 
This bad-faith use of the Global War on Terror and the ATP reached its 
zenith when the government proscribed three major Ethiopian political 
movements—the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF), and Ginbot 7—as terrorist organizations.234 The 
                                                          
228. In addition to its subjective and dangerously vague and broad formulations, the ATP 
contravenes several human rights provisions including non-derogable rights such as equality 
before the law, the prohibition against torture (Art. 18), and the right to fair trial (Arts. 19 & 
20). See ATP arts. 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 20, 23. For a more detailed account of the Proclamation, see 
Human Rights Watch, Legal Analysis of Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (Jun. 30, 2009), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/30/analysis-ethiopias-draft-anti-terrorism-law 
[https://perma.cc/WJP7-ULXL]; see also Hiruy Wubie, Some Points on the Ethiopian Anti-
Terrorism Law from Human Rights Perspective, 25 J. ETH. L. 24 (2012) (assessing the benefits and 
drawbacks of the ATP and finding significant scope for abuse and grounds for constitutional 
challenges). 
229. ATP Arts. 3, 5(1)(b)-(c); see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 228. 
230. Human Rights Watch, supra note 228. 
231. See FDRE CONST., arts. 13-44 (listing fundamental and human rights guaranteed 
under the Ethiopian Constitution). 
232. See End Use of Counter-Terrorism Law, supra note 20; Human Rights Watch, supra 
note 228. 
233. Updated: Terrorism charges in Ethiopia: Aggregate Table, ETHIO TRIAL TRACKER (Jun. 26, 
2017), https://ethiotrialtracker.org/new-terrorism-charges-in-ethiopia-aggregate-table 
[https://perma.cc/5MF8-BBF7]. 
234. See Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia, in WORLD REPORT 2012: EVENTS OF 2011, at 121, 121 
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OLF represents the political aspirations of the Oromo people and had 
actually co-authored the Transitional Charter with the EPRDF before 
withdrawing from the transitional arrangement due to “the absence of a 
level playing field.”235 The ONLF represents the ambitions for self-
determination of many in the Somali region and had been pushed out of 
the transitional arrangement after it unsuccessfully tried to hold a 
referendum on the future of the Somali region.236 Ginbot 7, also known as 
the Movement for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy, is a movement 
seeking democratic reform and is the offspring of the widely disputed 2005 
election and the violence that followed.237 All three political movements 
garner considerable appeal among Oromos, Somalis, and Pan-Ethiopian 
nationalists (including most Amharas) and collectively represent the 
aspirations of a significant portion of the Ethiopian population. 
The lawful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, association, 
and assembly by individuals belonging to these constituencies are often 
distorted, reinterpreted, and presented at official levels as conclusive 
evidence of support for one or more of these organizations.238 For example, 
in a major study of large-scale repression of dissent in Oromia, Amnesty 
International found that a “significant majority of Oromos arrested for their 
actual or suspected opposition to the government are accused of supporting 
the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).”239 The designation of these three major 
movements as terrorist organizations serves not only as a pretext for large-
scale repression but also as a way to magnify public perceptions of an 
existential threat. Within this context, one may understand the ATP not as 
legislative act designed to protect national security or enforce the 
international obligations of Ethiopia but as one normative instrument in the 
vast assemblage of military, security, institutional, and bureaucratic 
regimes, a “hostile act” carefully designed to stretch the state’s power 
beyond constitutional limits.240 
This narrative has allowed the government to target and eliminate its 
adversaries while legitimizing disproportionate policing, prosecution, and 
                                                          
(Jan. 2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4KVU-Q9NW]. 
235. ASNAKE KEFALE, FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA: A COMPARATIVE 
REGIONAL STUDY 25-26 (2013). 
236. See id. at 80. 
237. Australian Government Refugee Review Tribunal, Country Advice Ethiopia, at 3-4 (Sep. 
10, 2010), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d998f2b2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4N22-HEHS]. 
238. See Al Jazeera English, Talk to Al Jazeera - Hailemariam Desalegn: Democracy ‘Not Only an 
Election’ , YOUTUBE (May 22, 2015), https://youtu.be/VwimUr2C7mY (arguing that bloggers 
and journalists use their profession as a mask to conceal their terrorist ambitions); see also 
Amnesty Int’l, Ethiopia: 25 years of Human Rights Violations, AFR Index 25/4178/2016 (June 2, 
2016), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR2541782016ENGLISH.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6E42-KSFU]. 
239. “Because I am Oromo,” supra note 140, at 19. 
240. As Judith N. Shklar writes, “[a] persecutive law does not aim at punishing, it is an 
‘hostile act,’ an individualized act of war in which guilt and responsibility matter little, since 
prevention by elimination is, as in war, the end.” JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, 
AND POLITICAL TRIALS 216 (1964). 
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conviction of its opponents, all in the name of the Global War on Terror. 
The Ethiopian government has used counter-terrorism operations as 
justification to jail opposition politicians, silence independent voices, shrink 
the civic space, decimate civil society, suspended judicial guarantees, 
muzzle the free press, and entrench a de facto emergency. The hundred 
percent sweep by the ERPDF in the 2015 parliamentary election241 is the 
result of these authoritarian practices that have been enabled and justified 
by the war on terror and the concomitant securitization of political life.242 
Newman and Levine, channeling Agamben, summarize this narrative 
in a way that perfectly summarizes the Ethiopian context: 
 
The danger also lies in the term ‘terrorism’ itself: this is a mobile term 
that can be potentially extended and applied to virtually any form of 
anti-state or dissident activity. The ‘war on terror’ thus becomes an 
ideological tool for governments to repress protest movements. 
Terrorism reaffirms the power and authority of the sovereign state by 
allowing it to marginalize its enemies, real or imagined: terrorism thus 
seems to work in a sort of structural relationship to the state, allow the 
state to extend its powers and function . . . it has become . . . the 
ultimate standard of political legitimacy.243 
 
This narrative and the anti-terrorism law that it engendered have 
proven remarkably effective, but, as I will show in the next section, proved 
insufficient as the 2016 Oromo and Amhara protests gathered momentum. 
V. THE RECENT PROTESTS: A CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY, RESULTING IN A 
DE JURE STATE OF EMERGENCY 
The protests of the last five years by the Oromo, the Amhara, and by 
Muslim Ethiopians represented a crisis of legitimacy for the Ethiopian 
government and demonstrate both the dangers and vulnerabilities of its 
governing narratives. 
Protests by members of Ethiopia’s Muslim community began in 
December of 2011, when representatives of the Muslim community from 
across the country gathered in Addis Ababa to protest the government’s 
interference in their religious affairs, laying the basis for a nationwide 
                                                          
241. Felix Horne (Sr. Researcher, Horn of Africa, Human Rights Watch), Dispatches: 
Alarm Bells for Ethiopia’s 100% Election Victory (June 23, 2015) , 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/23/dispatches-alarm-bells-ethiopias-100-election-
victory [https://perma.cc/YGY9-HYDF]. 
242. Arriola & Lyons, supra note 120, at 76; Jacey Fortin, Government in Ethiopia Is on Track 
To Win with 100% of Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 22, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/world/africa/government-in-ethiopia-is-on-track-
to-win-with-100-of-vote.html [https://perma.cc/62AV-F6EL]. Although these sources note 
that the 100% election was completed through the election of EPRDF and its allied parties, 
those familiar with the inner workings of the government and Ethiopian politics seldom, if 
ever, make a distinction between them. 
243. Newman & Levine, supra note 72, at 27. 
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movement.244 By early 2012, a 17-member Arbitration Committee was 
formed245 to coordinate the struggle and to liaise with the government 
regarding its demands.246 
Sadly, the government responded to the movement’s demands with 
demonization and fearmongering. In the months that followed, the 
government and state media blamed protestors for violence and linked 
them with major terrorist groups such as al-Shabab and Boko-Haram.247 
Speaking in Parliament, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi denouncedthe 
protest movement as the work of “extremist Salafi elements” and linked it 
to al-Qaeda.248 Following Zenawi’s remarks, the government arrested the 
Arbitration Committee and other leading members of the Muslim 
community.249 After a lengthy pre-trial detention (during which some 
defendants alleged ill-treatment),250 these leaders were tried under the 
                                                          
244. See M. Zuhdi Jasser, Comm’r, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, Remarks on 
Conditions of Religious Freedom in Ethiopia at the Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 14, 
2013), http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/speeches/remarks-commissioner-m-zuhdi-jasser-
us-commission-international-religious-freedom [https://perma.cc/26X4-4UZM]. 
245. See id. 
246. The Committee presented three core demands. First and foremost, the program of 
forcible indoctrination of orthodox Muslims had to stop; second, the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs 
Council had to be replaced with an institution that was freely elected by the Muslim 
community; and, third, the government needed to refrain from further intervening in the 
affairs of the nation’s only Islamic college and to grant it institutional independence.  See Jon 
Abbink, Religious Freedom and the Political Order: The Ethiopian ‘Secular State’ and the Containment 
of Muslim Identity Politics, 8 J. E. AFR. STUD. 346, 354 (2014); see also Jasser, supra note 244 (noting 
that the Arbitration Committee’s goals were to “negotiate with the government about 
respecting the constitution’s religious freedom guarantees, ending the imposition of al-Ahbash 
on Ethiopian Muslims, reopening and returning schools and mosques to their original imams 
and administrators. The Committee also asked that new elections be held for the [Ethiopian 
Islamic Affairs Council] and that the voting take place in mosques, rather than in government 
community centers.”). 
247. See William Davidson, Ethiopia Airs Jihadi Film Amid Sensitive Muslim Protest Trial, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 14, 2013), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2013/0214/Ethiopia-airs-jihadi-film-amid-
sensitive-Muslim-protest-trial [https://perma.cc/F9UU-DYSL] (discussing the airing of a film 
on state TV during peak hours that “associates local Muslim protesters now on trial with 
militant groups such as Nigeria’s brutal Boko Haram movement and Somalia’s Al Shabab, as 
well as unrelated Ethiopian militants”). 
248. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s Address to Parliament, delivered in Amharic, is 
available at Mechachal, PM Meles Zenawi Answers Parliament Members Questions April 17, 2012 
(Ethiopian TV) - Part 3. Topics Discussed are Religious Extremism, Ethiopian Muslims, Ethiopian 
Christians, ETHIOTUBE (Apr. 17, 2012), https://www.ethiotube.net/video/19271/PM-Meles-
Zenawi-answers-parliament-members-questions-April-17-2012--Part-3. For a discussion of the 
content of these remarks, see Awol Allo & Abadir M. Ibrahim, Redefining Protest in Ethiopia: 
What Happens to the ‘Terror’ Narrative when Muslims Call for a Secular State?, OPENDEMOCRACY 
(Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.opendemocracy.net/awol-allo-abadir-m-ibrahim/redefining-
protest-in-ethiopia-what-happens-to-terror-narrative-when-musl [https://perma.cc/7Y82-
8ST3]. 
249. See Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Prominent Muslims Detained in Crackdown 
(Aug. 15, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/15/ethiopia-prominent-muslims-
detained-crackdown [https://perma.cc/3T7U-E7R2]. 
250. Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Muslim Protesters Face Unfair Trial (Apr. 2, 2013), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/02/ethiopia-muslim-protesters-face-unfair-trial 
[https://perma.cc/R8LV-J5VP]. 
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country’s sweeping anti-terror laws for “terrorism and conspiracy to create 
an Islamic state.”251 A three-year show trial252 resulted in prison sentences 
of between 7 and 21 years.253 
The Oromo protests, which began in November of 2015 and ultimately 
led to the imposition of the de jure emergency in October of 2016, trace their 
origins to a long history of ethnic subordination—first at the hands of the 
Amhara and now at the hands of the Tigray-dominated EPRDF. The 
immediate trigger, the Addis Ababa Master Plan, which called for the 
expansion of the capital’s territorial boundaries into Oromo lands,254 is 
directly tied to the EPRDF’s “Ethiopia Rising” narrative. For a government 
that relies on economic development to legitimize its authority and sees the  
the manufacturing sector as critical to its development agenda,255 territorial 
expansion into Oromo lands was an existential imperative. For the Oromo, 
however, decades of land grabbing meant this was already a step too far.256 
As the Oromos took to the streets in 2015 to protest this expansion, they 
sought to frame their grievances in human rights and constitutional 
terms.257 They pointed to the language of the Constitution itself, which 
                                                          
251. Ethiopia Jails Muslims Convicted of Terror Plot, BBC (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33759946 [https://perma.cc/S33B-375X]. 
252. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 249 (quoting Lelsie Lefkow, Deputy Africa 
Director of Human Rights Watch, as saying that “[t]he government’s treatment of these 
Muslim leaders bears the hallmarks of a politically motivated prosecution.”). 
253. See Mahlet Fasil, An Ethiopian Court Jailed Muslim Leaders, Activists, to Lengthy Terms, 
ADDIS STANDARD (Aug. 3, 2015), http://addisstandard.com/an-ethiopian-court-jailed-
muslim-leaders-activists-to-lengthy-terms [https://perma.cc/4H3J-K9KA]. 
254. See Fortin, supra note 18; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 21. The Master Plan called for a 
twenty-fold expansion in Addis Ababa’s administrative boundaries. Human Rights Watch, 
“Such a Brutal Crackdown,” Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests, at 13 
(Jun. 2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ethiopia0616web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V87T-EXJE] [hereinafter “Such a Brutal Crackdown”]. 
255. See GTP II, supra note 172, at 2; see also, Ethiopian Industrial Development Strategic Plan 
(2013-2025), FDRE MINISTRY OF INDUS. 20 (Sep. 2013), 
http://www.moin.gov.et/documents/93482/133019/57+English+MoI++Strategic+plan-
.pdf/38dbde1f-9721-4df8-8c9b-f9c8e81d35c9 [PERMA] (outlining the Ministry of Industry’s 
industrial zone development strategy, placing most such zones within a 100 km radius of 
Addis Ababa); see also Mulu Gebreeyesus, Industrial Policy and Development in Ethiopia: 
Evolution and Present Experimentation, BROOKINGS INST. (Learning to Compete, Working Paper 
No. 6) (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/L2C_WP6_Gebreeyesus-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M6J-7YJW] 
(detailing recent developments in Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector, most of which have taken 
place near Addis Ababa). 
256. See “Such a Brutal Crackdown,” supra note 254 (“Protesters fear the expansion will 
further displace Oromo farmers without consultation or adequate compensation. Addis Ababa 
has already experienced significant growth over the past 10 years, resulting in significant 
displacement of Oromo farmers from land around the city. On the rare occasions that 
authorities have provided compensation, the funds are usually inadequate to make up for lost 
livelihoods and farmers rarely receive alternate land. There is little recourse for the losses in 
courts or other institutions.”). 
257. See, e.g., ODF Statement on Ethiopia’s Current Situation, OROMO DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://oromodemocraticfront.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ODF-
Statement-On-The-Current-Crisis-In-Ethiopia_Feb-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN2H-SD62]; 
Letter to U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, from Oromo Democratic Front (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://oromodemocraticfront.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ODF-Letter-to-US-
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recognizes that “[t]he special interest of the state of Oromia with respect to 
supply of services or the utilization of resources or administrative matters 
arising from the presence of the city of Addis Ababa within the state of 
Oromia shall be protected”258 and requires the federal government to enact 
laws determining the particulars.259 More than two decades after the 
Constitution’s ratification, however, no legislative framework is yet in 
place, an omission which arguably renders the capital’s expansion and the 
concomitant land-grabs  unconstitutional.260 
The Oromos also questioned the political motivations behind the Addis 
Ababa Master Plan.261 According to the government, the purpose of the 
plan was to integrate the capital city and Oromia through infrastructure 
projects, in the process ensuring effective provision of basic social 
services,262 a framing that one advocacy group argued was designed to 
mask the government’s single-minded focus on annexation to fuel Addis 
Ababa’s growth.263 If implemented, the Oromos felt that the Master Plan 
would accelerate the displacement and eviction of Oromo farmers from 
                                                          
Secretary-John-Kerry.pdf [https://perma.cc/C25H-9PH6]; see also Tsegaye R. Ararssa, Why 
Resist The Addis Abeba Master Plan? – A Constitutional Legal Exploration, ADDIS STANDARD (Aug. 
20, 2015), http://addisstandard.com/why-resist-the-addis-abeba-master-plan-a-
constitutional-legal-exploration [https://perma.cc/XR57-JE6G](laying out a constitutional 
case to resist the Master Plan). 
258. FDRE CONST. art. 49(4). 
259. Id. 
260. For further explanation of this conclusion, see Tsegaye R. Ararssa, Commentary, The 
Interest That is Not So Special: Addis Ababa, Oromia, and Ethiopia, ADDIS STANDARD (Jan. 18, 
2017), http://addisstandard.com/the-interest-that-is-not-so-special-addis-abeba-oromia-and-
ethiopia [https://perma.cc/EDA3-7D4Y]. 
261. In a popular song titled “Maaster Plaanii” (“Master Plan”), Oromo artist Caala 
Bultume says, “Maaster plaanii jedhanii sanyii si duguuguuf malaanii” (“They called you a 
master plan to carryout ethnic cleansing in disguise” translation mine). CAALAA BULTUMEE, 
MAASTER PLANIII (2015), available at Independent Oromia, Caalaa Bultumee (Qeerransoo) – 2015 
“Maaster Pilaanii,” YOUTUBE (Nov. 30, 2015) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MUu0z9W1U6E. For further discussion of how the 
Addis Ababa Master Plan is understood is understood as more than just a development plan, 
see Jason Burke, ‘It’s Life and Death’: How the Growth of Addis Ababa has Sparked Ethnic Tensions, 
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/mar/13/life-
death-growth-addis-ababa-racial-tensions [https://perma.cc/6MKG-9DXV];  see also ‘Foreign 
Firms Attacked’ as Ethopia Protests Continue, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 2, 2016), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/firms-attacked-ethiopia-protests-continue-
160902064459286.html [https://perma.cc/MM6J-E7KY]. 
262. Endalk Chala, Violence Clashes in Ethiopia over ‘Master Plan’ to Expand Addis, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/11/ethiopia-
protests-master-plan-addis-ababa-students [https://perma.cc/DG6W-PP3P] (noting that the 
Ethiopian government’s claim “that the plan was intended only to facilitate the development 
of infrastructure such as transportation, utilities and recreation centres”); see also World Bank 
Group & Global Facility for Disaster Reduction & Recovery, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Enhancing 
Urban Resilience, at 27 (July 2015), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/559781468196153638/pdf/100980-REVISED-
WP-PUBLIC-Box394816B-Addis-Ababa-CityStrength-ESpread-S.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6AGV-2L3L] (discussing the lack of basic services in Addis Ababa and 
mapping elements of the Master Plan). 
263. The Agenda Behind the “Integrated Regional Development Plan (IRDP),” 
ADVOCACY4OROMIA, https://advocacy4oromia.org/forum/the-agenda-behind-the-
integrated-regional-development-plan-irdp [https://perma.cc/D5KK-98BD]. 
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their ancestral lands,264 ultimately cleansing the area of Oromo culture and 
identity.265 Note, however, that the protestors did not call on the 
government to cease expansion of Addis Ababa entirely. Rather, they called 
on the government to pursue inclusive and coherent development policies 
through fair processes. 
The protestors’ demands and their reference to the Ethiopian legal 
framework starkly contrasted with the government’s response. Situating 
the protests within specifically Ethiopian narratives of terrorism and 
development, then-Government Communications Minister Getachew Reda 
argued that  “an organized and armed terrorist force aiming to create havoc 
and chaos have begun murdering model farmers, public leaders and other 
ethnic groups residing in the region.”266Prime Minister Desalegn 
condemned the protests as “destructive forces” and issued an ultimatum, 
stating that the government “will take merciless legitimate action against 
any force bent on destabilizing the area.”267 The government followed 
through with that threat, and its forceful response resulted in the deaths of 
hundreds.268 
Intimidation, however, was met with more protests.269 Frustrated by a 
government that had failed to live up to the ideals set forth in its own 
Constitution, angered by its increasingly repressive practices, and 
disillusioned by their attempts at reform, protestors were now united in 
their calls for a change to the regime itself.270 After the October Irreecha 
stampede killed at least fifty-two protestors,271 the protests reached their 
most intense levels. Responding to this tragedy, organizers called for “five 
days of rage”272 and, in a shift of tactics, began damaging government 
property and corporate investments throughout the region.273 Oromos who 
were forced off their land by the government’s developmental imperative 
were now attacking the “Ethiopia Rising” narrative at its source,274 aware 
                                                          
264. ‘Foreign Firms Attacked’ as Ethopia Protests Continue, supra note 261. 
265. See BULTUMEE, supra note 261. 
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[https://perma.cc/GG27-YLFB]. 
267. Id. 
268. See Report: 669 Killed in Ethiopia Violence Since August, supra note 12. 
269. See “Such a Brutal Crackdown,” supra note 254 (noting that, “[a]s the protests continued 
into December and early 2016, protesters also increasingly voiced anger and frustration at the 
brutal response of the security forces to the protests – the killings and mass arrest of protesters 
and the suppression of Oromo associations and political parties.”). 
270. Conor Gafney, Can Ethiopia’s New Cabinet Address the Oromo Protests?, NEWSWEEK 
(Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/can-ethiopias-new-cabinet-address-oromo-
protests-518375 [https://perma.cc/3UAD-Z2LD]. 
271. See discussion and sources cited, supra note 33. 
272. Ethiopia: ‘Several’ Killed in Oromia Festival Stampede, supra note 33. 
273. Aglionby & Honan, supra note 35. 
274. See Aaron Maasho, Ethiopian Protesters Attack Factories in Africa’s Rising Economic Star, 
REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-unrest/ethiopian-
protesters-attack-factories-in-africas-rising-economic-star-idUSKCN1270MX 
[https://perma.cc/EN3E-TL2A]; see also ‘Foreign Firms Attacked’ as Ethopia Protests Continue, 
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that, without the support of foreign investments (and development 
assistance), the EPRDF would be left without the resources to achieve the 
development objectives on which it had staked so much of its legitimacy.275 
Looking beyond Oromia, simultaneous protests in Amhara 
significantly escalated the threat against the ERPDF’s brutal one-party rule. 
When Amhara protestors took to the streets to express their own 
grievances,276 the geographic scope and intensity of the protest suddenly 
expanded and deepened. In their protests, the Amharas did not merely 
express their grievances but also expressed solidarity with the Oromos,277 
their historic adversaries,278 representing a truly formidable challenge to the 
rule of the EPRDF.279 This budding expression of solidarity between the 
two communities, which represent around 60% of Ethiopia’s population,280 
and the unprecedented scope and intensity of the protests, sent shockwaves 
through the entire EPRDF establishment. 
The government’s response was to maintain its rule through any means 
necessary, invoking Article 93 to declare the country’s first ever formal state 
of emergency.281 With the state of emergency taking on de jure status, the 
military and security forces officially gained sweeping new legal powers282 
and no longer has a reason to hide the brutality of its repression. Over the 
subsequent several weeks, the government authorized the army to operate 
throughout the country,283 restricted access to the internet, banned protests, 
                                                          
supra note 264. 
275. See id. GTP II requires roughly $120 billion in foreign exchange “through exports of 
goods and services, official transfers, foreign direct investment (FDI) and external borrowing is 
projected to reach $115 [billion] during the plan period.” GTP II, supra note 172, at 118. Note 
that FDI did, in fact, drop by 20% during the second half of 2016, as a result of these protests 
and the state of emergency. Nizar Manek, Foreign Investment in Ethiopia Slumps After Business 
Attacks, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-
15/foreign-investment-in-ethiopia-slumps-after-businesses-attacked [https://perma.cc/6YAJ-
M89A]. Finally, it is important to note that development officials are well aware of the 
regime’s reliance on them. As one World Bank official said to Human Rights Watch, “I like to 
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Rights Watch, supra note 100, at 23. 
276. See sources cited supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
277. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
278. See SHAFAW, supra note 29, at 211 (noting that historical animosity between the Oromo 
and Amhara is more than a century old). 
279. See Ethiopia: Unprecedented Protests Creep Towards the Capital, supra note 28 (“[G]iven 
the size of the Amhara and Oromo populations in Ethiopia, the threat they present should not 
be taken lightly. . . . If opposition to the government increases along ethnic lines, the ruling 
elite or even Ethiopia’s security forces could fracture.”). 
280. Ethiopia, supra note 1. The Oromo and Amhara comprise 34.4% and 27% of Ethiopia’s 
population, respectively. Id. 
281. See Ethiopia Declares State of Emergency Amid Continuing Protests, NPR: ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/09/497292914/ethiopia-declares-
state-of-emergency-amid-continuing-protests [https://perma.cc/VYV7-X6H4] (noting that 
this was the first declaration of a state of emergency in Ethiopia in the past twenty-five years). 
282. See Ethiopia: State of Emergency Risks New Abuses, supra note 4 (discussing analysis 
by Felix Horne, the Senior Africa Researcher for Human Rights Watch). 
283. Id. 
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prevented access to some broadcast and print media, and detained more 
than 26,000 protestors in “rehabilitation camps.”284 
Although these measures largely succeeded in bringing an uneasy calm 
to the country,285 why the government needed to invoke Article 93 to apply 
these measures is not immediately apparent. Ethiopia was, after all, 
operating under a de facto state of emergency, during which the 
government had perpetrated a number of the same abuses. In the years 
preceding this declaration, the government was already  regularly arresting 
journalists and opposition politicians and quashing political adversaries 
and protesters with excessive force.286 
I believe we can dispel of the notion that the government declared this 
state of emergency to gain the necessary power to secure the vital interests 
of the state or to protect the Constitutional order. No public emergency 
threatened the life of the nation. Furthermore, the extreme measures taken 
by the government, including the detention of over 26,000 individuals, 
clearly exceeded those measures “strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.” 287 Rather, on its face, the invocation of pubic emergency merely 
aimed to do that which is clearly impermissible under the Constitution and 
under international human rights law: “to defend the government in power 
at the price of muzzling political opponents.”288 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered a theoretical and legal account of the state of 
emergency and its particular manifestations in Ethiopia. I have argued that, 
in post-1995 Ethiopia, the state of emergency has been the government’s 
modus operandi, blurring any meaningful distinction between the rule and 
the exception, and between normalcy and emergency. The Constitution, 
which catalogues a wide-range of highly progressive rights, plays no 
meaningful role in the regulation of state-society relations. Civil liberties, 
the rule of law, independent judiciary, federalism, free press, and civil 
society, which are envisioned by the Constitution as the central pillars of 
the political order, form minor aspects of political life. Thus, from a 
normative constitutional point of view, the de jure state of emergency 
formally imposed on October 8, 2016, is nothing more than a recodification 
                                                          
284. See sources cited supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
285. See Schemm, supra note 13. 
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are only those “strictly required by the exigencies of the circumstances.” ICCPR, supra note 45, 
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such a proclamation.” Human Rights Comm., supra note 92, ¶ 5. Note, however, that while the 
State of Emergency was enacted nationwide, the unrest was largely limited to two regions of 
the country. See Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia, in WORLD REPORT 2017: EVENTS OF 2016, at 251, 
251 (2017) (noting the protests and crackdowns occurred in the Oromia and Amhara regions). 
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of the de facto state of emergency that has been in place since the 
Constitution came into force. 
A closer examination of the two governing narratives—the “National 
Security” narrative and the “Ethiopia Rising” narrative—reveals how extra-
constitutional state violence converges with propaganda, providing the 
government’s brutal use of force with a mantle of domestic and 
international legitimacy. That these narratives carry ethnic dimensions 
further demonstrates their insidious functions: they play a decisive 
ideological role in justifying  the transformation of the norm into the 
exception, the temporary into the indefinite. In a country in which ethnic 
identity has become the basic principle of political competition and the 
main means of expressing dissent,289 these narratives play a powerful 
mediating role, enabling a series of strategic manooeuvres and masking 
structural inequalities, hierarchies, and asymmetries that are indexed to 
ethnicity and used in the interest of maintaining ethnic privileges. The 
notions of security and development prescribed by these narratives, the 
kind of peace and order defended by the ruling elites, are neither pacific 
nor orderly. Rather, they are a kind of coded war aimed at institutionalizing 
militarized kleptocracy and apocalyptic visions of security that annihilate 
the very possibility of democratic politics. 
Against this background, I suggest that the 1995 Constitution, along 
with the ideological, normative, and institutional principles used to justify 
and legitimize the government’s rule, should be understood not as 
expressing the collective will of the Ethiopian people but rather as a 
juridical expression of a pre-existing relationship of inequality between the 
various ethnic groups. The fact that the protests that ultimately led to the de 
jure state of emergency were led by the country’s two major ethnic groups 
against a government dominated by a minority ethnic group requires us to 
pay a closer attention to the ethnicity-emergency nexus and the viability of 
the Ethiopian multinational federal experiment. 
Although the de jure emergency is over, the deeper asymmetries and 
structural anomalies responsible for the underlying grievances still remain. 
Indeed, in the months since the emergency was lifted, there have been 
sporadic protests in Oromia, including a three-day market-boycott and 
“stay-at-home campaign.290 More recently, there have been violent clashes 
between ethnic Oromos and Somalis along the border between their 
respective regional states, resulting in  the killings of dozens and the 
displacement of at least 75,000 people.291 It is widely believed that the 
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conflict between the two regions was orchestrated by TPLF officials who 
dominate the nation’s military and intelligence, signaling the government’s 
intensification of  militarized patronage and divide-and-rule policies after 
the de jure state of emergency. 
 
Unless the government begins to confront the systemic and structural 
anomalies at the heart of the political order, and address the central 
political questions that continues to unsettle and destabilize it from under 
its normative mainstay, Ethiopia will remain under a perpetual state of 
emergency. As the relentless protests of the last few years have shown,  the 
authoritarian tools that proved effective in the past can no longer guarantee 
the submission of an agitated and restless crowed calling for change.  
 
 
                                                          
outlining the origins and implications of this violence). 
